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Abstract
We study global trade responses to the US-China trade war. We estimate the tariff
impacts on product-level exports to the US, China, and rest of world. On average, countries
decreased exports to China and increased exports to the US and rest of world. Most countries
export products that complement the US and substitute China, and a subset operate along
downward-sloping supplies. Heterogeneity in responses, rather than specialization, drives
export variation across countries. Surprisingly, global trade increased in the products targeted
by tariffs. Thus, despite ending the trend towards tariff reductions, the trade war did not halt
global trade growth.
∗Maximilian Schwarz provided excellent research assistance. E-mail: pfajgelb@princeton.edu,
penny.goldberg@yale.edu, patrick.kennedy@berkeley.edu, ak2796@columbia.edu, dtaglioni@worldbank.org. We
thank Veronica Rappaport and Irene Brambilla for their conference discussions of the paper; Juan Carlos Hallak and
Ahmad Lashkaripour for helpful comments; and seminar participants at Australasian Meeting of the Econometric
Society, 2021 ERWIT, Bank of Portugal, Barcelona Summer Workshop, CEU Vienna, China Meeting of Econometric
Society, Federal Reserve Board, HKU, Harvard/MIT, Indiana, LACEA/LAMES, LACEA TIGN, NBER ITI, Penn State,
Princeton, UCSD, and SMU for comments.
1 Introduction
In 2018 and 2019, the world’s two largest economies—the US and China—engaged in a trade war,
mutually escalating tariffs that ultimately covered about $450 billion in trade flows. The US also
imposed tariff increases on steel and aluminum imports from nearly all countries, and China cut its
tariffs across sectors for all countries except the US. These policies upended a decades-long trend
toward reducing global trade barriers, with many of the escalated tariffs persisting beyond 2021.
A recent body of work has studied the impacts of the trade war on the US and China, showing
that the trade war reduced trade between these countries. In this paper, we shift attention to
patterns of trade reallocation across the world. How did the trade war affect the exports of
“bystander” countries? Studying the export responses to the trade war of countries other than
the US and China provide an opportunity to uncover the economic forces that shape global trade.
A natural hypothesis is that some countries had the good fortune to specialize in products
targeted by the trade war, and thus benefited from US and Chinese substitution into those
countries’ exports. Alternatively, countries with similar comparative advantages across products
could have responded differently. On the demand side, buyers may perceive some origins as
close substitutes to Chinese or US varieties, and others as complements. There may be further
demand-side mechanisms involving supply chains: as the US and China trade less among
themselves, they may also import fewer intermediate goods from other countries. On the
supply side, the resulting changes in the scale of production may have impacted marginal costs.
Countries gaining scale in the US or China would reallocate away from the rest of the world under
conventional upward-sloping supply curves, but the opposite would be true if the supply curves
slope downward. In that case, countries would increase their exports not only to the US or China
but also to the rest of the world.
The empirical analysis is guided by a Ricardian-Armington model that captures these forces
by including flexible demand (specifically, asymmetric translog) and supply elasticities. We
derive an estimating equation in which the product-level export growth of each country to
the US, CH , and the rest of the world (RW ) varies with the product-level tariffs that the US
and China impose on each other. Conditioning on origin-destination-sector fixed effects that
capture general-equilibrium shifters, the combined country-specific response elasticities from
these specifications identify whether the exports from each country substitute or complement
the US and China, and whether each country operates along downward or upward-sloping
supply curves. For example, consider the US tariff increases on China. These tariffs reduce
Chinese exports to the US, and shift US demand towards the exports of countries selling varieties
that substitute China. At the same time, these tariffs may also shift US demand away from
countries selling varieties that complement China. For countries that substitute China, an increase
(reduction) in exports to the rest of the world in products more heavily taxed by the US reveals a
downward (upward) supply curve.
We implement the model-implied estimating equation on global bilateral HS6-level trade data.
As a starting point, we estimate the average export responses of the US, China, and remaining
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countries to the trade war tariffs, imposing common elasticities across the bystanders. Trade
between the US and China declined because of the tariffs, with each country not only reducing
imports of the products where it imposed higher import tariffs (as would be expected), but also
reducing exports of those products.
On average, the bystander countries of the trade war (i.e., countries other than US and China)
increased their exports to the US in response to the US tariffs, but reduced their exports to China
in response to the Chinese tariffs. In addition, these countries increased their exports to the rest of
the world in products with higher US-China tariffs. Thus, even though US and China largely
taxed each other, the countries in the rest of the world, on average, increased trade amongst
themselves in the targeted products. We aggregate these responses using the importance of each
origin-destination-product trade flow in initial trade and find that bystander countries increased
their global exports in response to the trade war.1
Next, we estimate more flexible regression specifications that allow countries to respond
heterogeneously to the tariffs. Across countries, we find substantial cross-country variation in
export elasticities to each destination in response to the tariffs. Through the lens of the model,
these results suggest significant heterogeneity across countries in their demand substitutability or
complementarity with the US and China, and in whether they operate along upward or downward
supply curves. For example, 8 countries increased exports to US, CH , and RW in response
to US-China’s bilateral tariffs; revealing these countries to export substitutes to US and Chinese
varieties, and to operate along downward supply curves.
These dimensions of country heterogeneity are not present in standard quantitative trade
models in the style of Eaton and Kortum (2002) or Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) that underlie
typical general-equilibrium analyses of trade shocks. However, incorporating both of these
margins rationalizes the patterns that we observe in the trade war. Therefore, our empirical results
concerning the heterogeneity in response elasticities across countries give support to gravity
models with non-constant elasticities of substitution studied by Adao, Costinot, and Donaldson
(2017) and Lind and Ramondo (2018).
The estimation with country-specific responses yields a standard deviation across countries
in predicted global export growth of 4.4%, compared to just 1.3% from the estimation that
imposes a common response across bystander countries. This contrast implies that specialization
patterns cannot explain the export winners and losers from the trade war. Instead, the responses
were largely driven by heterogeneity in the export response elasticities across exporters. When
accounting for the precision of the estimated responses, the tariffs raised global exports for 19
countries and reduced exports for 1 country; and we cannot statistically reject that the tariffs had
no impact for the remaining 28 bystander countries.
Overall, the empirical analysis yields five key takeaways. First, the US and China reduced
1Throughout the paper, our predictions for aggregate export growth hold the exporter-importer-country fixed
effects from the regressions constant. That is, we compute country-level export growth as the inner product of
country-level tariff responses, tariffs, and export shares. In the model, these responses are interpreted as the effects
of tariffs on the exports of a product variety when the price of that variety is allowed to change to clear goods markets,
while aggregate demand and factor prices are kept constant.
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trade with each other. Second, many countries reallocated exports into the US and away from
China, and increased their exports to the rest of the world. Third, the growth in total exports
induced by the trade war was heterogeneous across countries. Fourth, this heterogeneity was due
to country-specific elasticities, rather than product-level specialization patterns. Fifth, when we
aggregate the responses globally, the trade war raised global trade by 3.0% (with a bootstrapped
standard error of 0.7%). This result suggests that the trade war created new trade opportunities in
aggregate and did not simply reshuffle trade flows. While the trade war reversed decades-long
trends towards tariff reductions, our results suggest that globalization, as measured through
export growth, has not come to a halt.
A growing body of research has studied the effects of the trade war, focusing primarily
on its impacts on the US economy.2 Our contribution is to estimate how the tariffs impacted
exports from the world’s largest exporters. We estimate heterogeneous responses to tariff-driven
demand shocks across countries and provide evidence supporting significant heterogeneity across
countries in substitutability or complementarity with the US and China, as well as in the slopes of
the product-level supply curves that determine the adjustment to these demand shocks.
Identifying sector-level scale economies has been a focus of empirical research in trade since
at least Antweiler and Trefler (2002) and, more recently, Costinot, Donaldson, Kyle, and Williams
(2019).3 These analyses show that cross-sectional differences in domestic and foreign market sizes
may identify supply slopes. Through the lens of a trade model with flexible demand substitution,
our analysis shows that the patterns of export responses to both the countries imposing tariffs and
the rest of the world identify the sign of supply curves.4 In our analysis, the export responses
are identified over the medium run (two years) across HS6 products. At the firm level, Albornoz,
Brambilla, and Ornelas (2020) show that Argentinean firms exiting the US due to increased trade
barriers also exit other destinations, while Almunia, Antràs, Lopez Rodriguez, and Morales (2018)
show that Spanish firms facing domestic demand reductions during the Great Recession reallocate
into exporting.5
We do not take a stance on the microfoundation of the supply curves. Recent research offers
plentiful explanations, including Marshallian external economies of scale as in Grossman and
2See Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019), Cavallo, Gopinath, Neiman, and Tang (2021), Fajgelbaum, Goldberg,
Kennedy, and Khandelwal (2020), Flaaen, Hortaçsu, and Tintelnot (2020), Flaaen and Pierce (2019), and Waugh (2019),
among others. Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2021) review the research that has examined the economic impacts of the
trade war.
3See also Bartelme, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodriguez-Clare (2019), Farrokhi and Soderbery (2020) and
Lashkaripour and Lugovskyy (2017). Consistent with downward-sloping supply for US producers. Breinlich, Leromain,
Novy, and Sampson (2021) show that the reduction in tariff uncertainty after the US granted of normal trade relations
to China, which had been shown to raise US imports and reduce employment in the sectors where the uncertainty
reduction was larger (Pierce and Schott, 2016), prompted a reduction in US exports in those sectors.
4We find evidence that the elasticities of substitution between the goods produced by each exporter and the US and
China vary by exporter. This evidence is consistent with the translog demand system with asymmetric substitution
patterns that we use. Existing studies in international trade using variants of translog or its non-homothetic extension
(the almost-ideal demand system), such as Novy (2012), Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008), Feenstra and Weinstein
(2017), and Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016), impose symmetric substitution elasticities across origins.
5Ahn and McQuoid (2017) and Morales, Sheu, and Zahler (2019) provide further firm-level evidence of interactions
across destinations.
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Rossi-Hansberg (2010) and Kucheryavyy, Lyn, and Rodríguez-Clare (2016), firm-level increasing
returns with monopolistic competition as in Krugman (1980), and increasing returns through
reorganization (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012) or greater division of labor (Chaney and
Ossa, 2013), among other possibilities.6 Differentiating among these potential mechanisms may
be possible as firm-level data across countries becomes available during this period.
The next section presents the framework that guides the estimation and interpretation of the
results. Section 3 describes the data and presents a visual analysis of global reallocation from the
tariffs. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 explores some further results and robustness
checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Framework
This section presents the framework that guides the empirical analysis.
2.1 Environment
There is a set I of countries (indexed by i for exporters and n for importers) and a set Ωj of products
(indexed by ω) in sector j = 1, ...,J . We let piω be the price received by competitive producers of
product ω in country i. In each country there is a translog aggregator of imported and domestic
varieties of each product ω used as an input in production or for final consumption. Specifically,





σi′i ln pni′ω, (1)
where pniω is the tariff-inclusive price in country n. The parameter a
n
iω captures an idiosyncratic
demand of country n for the variety iω.
The semi-elasticities σi′i are common across importing countries and sectors. They capture
the substitutability between products from i and i′. When σi′i > 0 (σi′i < 0) it means that that
varieties i′ and i are substitutes (complements), as an increase in the price of either leads to increase
(reduction) in any country n’s expenditure share (and quantity) purchased in the other variety.





Additivity and symmetry of the substitution matrix require that ∑Ni=1 aniω = 1 for all n and ω, as
well as:
σi′i = σii′ for all i, i′, (2)
6As shown by Flaaen, Hortaçsu, and Tintelnot (2020) for washing machines, a consequence of the trade war has been
a reallocation of supply chains whereby product-specific capital migrates from China to other countries, such as Korea,
that serve as export platforms to the US. Our finding of an increase in exports from countries in the rest of the world
to other countries in the rest of the world in products where the US or China impose higher tariffs may be explained
by these types of reallocations, as long as some of the previously enumerated forces are also at work. For example, a
natural explanation à la Krugman (1980) would be that setting each new plant in Korea entails a fixed cost, creating a





σii′ = 0 for all i. (3)
We further assume7
σii′ = σRW for i′ 6= i and i, i′ 6= US,CH . (4)
Trading frictions are of two kinds. There are iceberg trade costs, so that τniω units of variety
iω must be shipped to n for one unit to arrive. Also, country n imposes ad-valorem tariffs tniω on
imports of good ω from i. Letting piω ≡ piiω be the domestic price of variety iω and assuming






where Tniω ≡ 1 + tniω is one plus the ad-valorem tariff.
The translog aggregator is used either for production or final consumption. The total sales of ω





where bi the inverse supply elasticity defined as the elasticity of price of total sales. The supply
shifters are partitioned into two components: an endogenous country-sector component Aijand
an exogenous cost shifter Ziω. The former captures factor and input prices that are common to
different products within a sector, which may respond endogenously to tariffs. The supply curve
is potentially downward sloping (bi < 0). We show a standard micro-foundation of this supply in
Appendix B.1.8
The previous expressions determine supply and spending across origins and products. A
world equilibrium is given by prices {piω} such that markets clear; i.e., the aggregate sales Xiω






where Enω are country-level expenditures in product ω.
To complete the description of a fully-specified general equilibrium model, one would need to
determine how the country-sector supply shifters and demand shifters are determined. However,
for the purposes of our empirical analysis, we do not impose additional restrictions. These shifters
can respond to tariffs, and the empirical analysis will control for them using fixed effects in the
econometric specifications. As a result, our analysis is consistent with a range of assumptions
about internal and international factor reallocation. At the same time, our estimations of a country
ranking of export growth keeps the fixed-effects constant, and therefore only captures the impact
7The tariff variation from the trade war does not offer enough variation to incorporate in our regressions a flexible
σii′ for country pairs that do not include the US or China.
8This formulation imposes that different products in ω use the same bundle of inputs. As discussed further below,
some of our findings could be consistent with a specific shape of input-output linkages within 6-digit product codes,
such that the taxed products use themselves as inputs in production at this 6-digit level. In that case the supply curve
would include an additional ω-specific component that captures the intensity of this force.
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of tariffs given those shifters.
2.2 Impact of US-China Tariffs on Exports across the World
Consider an increase in the US tariffs on the imports of a given product ω from China, ∆ lnTUSCH,ω.
How do these shocks affect the exports of countries other than the US and China (i 6= CH,US) to
the US, and the rest of the world (n = US,CH,RW )?
Taking a first-order approximation around an initial equilibrium of the model described in the
previous section, the impact of tariffs can be expressed in the reduced form as:
∆ lnXniω = β̃n1iω∆ lnTUSCH,ω + ... (8)
where ∆ ln (Y ) ≡ ln (Y ′)− ln (Y ) is the log-difference between the post-tariff equilibrium Y ′ and
pre-tariff equilibrium Y of a given variable and β̃n1iω is the response to US tariffs on China of
country i’s exports of product ω to destination n. The omitted terms include the changes in Chinese
tariffs on the US, as well as the changes in tariffs that the US and China imposed on all other
countries. We discuss these additional terms in the next subsection, and we include them in the
empirical analysis.
The tariff response elasticities β̃n1iω and β̃
n
2iω depend on general-equilibrium interactions and are
therefore a function of all the model parameters. We will run versions of (8) that impose varying
degrees of flexibility on these response elasticities. To interpret these upcoming regressions, we
now focus on a special case where some channels are muted and we can obtain a closed-form
specification.
Specifically, similar to Costinot, Donaldson, Kyle, and Williams (2019), we take the
first-order approximation in (8) around an equilibrium with symmetric distributions of sales
and expenditures.9 We take the approximation around a point sniω = si, such that all countries
have the same import composition but exporters may have different shares of world trade. This
approximation guarantees that country-level shifters affect the exports of variety iω differentially
across exporters, but in the same way across products within an exporter-product. With this
assumption, as implied by Appendix B.2, equation (8) can be re-written as follows:















To obtain this expression, we find the value of ∆ ln piω, the change in the price of variety iω, that
clears the world market for that variety when tariffs change, given the remaining price changes in
the economy and the changes in demand and supply shifters.
Compared to (8), equation (9) includes two key differences. First, many general-equilibrium
effects from the tariffs are absorbed by constants αnij that vary by importer, exporter, and sector.
9Equation (8) shows the elasticities corresponding to each tariff before imposing the symmetry assumption. In that
case, the elasticity βn1i in 6 discussed in the proposition becomes a function of the trade shares in the initial equilibrium.
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These constants capture the previously defined changes in aggregate demand by importer and
sector, Enj , and in sector-level supply by exporter, Aij , as well as sector-level components of price
changes in China and the US. In our empirical analysis, these effects are absorbed by fixed effects
that vary by origin, destination and sector.
Second, due to assuming an approximation around a symmetric equilibrium, the tariff
response elasticities in (9) no longer vary by product. Instead, the coefficient βn1i vary by
exporter-importer, and so do the coefficients corresponding to the remaining tariff changes
not shown in (9). The heterogeneity in the responses across countries can be mapped in a
straightforward way to the demand and supply drivers of trade in a way that reveals the
substitutabilities and scale economies. Specifically, using the closed-form expressions in (10) and
(B.38) we can interpret the elasticities estimated in the next sections as follows:
Proposition 1. When the US imposes a tariff on China in product ω, then:
(i) assuming a large number of countries ( NN−1 ≈ 1), exports from i to the US increase (decrease)
iff σCHi > 0 (σCHi < 0), implying that country i’s products are a substitute (complement) of Chinese
products; more generally, if σCHi > 0 (σCHi < 0), exports from i to the US increase (decrease) iff bisi/σii ∈
(−∞, 1] ∪ [ NN−1 ,∞).
(ii) assuming negatively sloped demand (σii < 0), if country i’s products are a substitute (complement)
of Chinese products and exports increase (decrease) from i to the rest of the world, then supply is negatively
sloped (bi < 0); more generally, if σCHi > 0 (σCHi < 0) then exports increase (decrease) from i to the rest




The proposition yields a taxonomy whereby the responses of a country’s exports to the US
and to the world when the US taxes China reveal both the substitutability between that country’s
products and Chinese varieties and the slope of supply curves. While the proposition describes
the results using a US tariff on Chinese products, a similar logic applies for Chinese tariffs on US
imports. In that case, the results would reveal the substitutability between a country’s products
and US varieties. Due to the linear nature of the approximation, whether the omitted terms in (9)
corresponding to the additional tariffs are included in the empirical specification does not affect
the structural interpretation in (10) that underlies the proposition.10
Table 1 shows the possible cases. As implied by part (i) of the proposition, when the US
taxes imports from China then an increase in country i’s exports to the US reveals country i as
a substitute for China. In that case, the tariff translates into a positive demand shock for country
i’s production of good ω. Conversely, a reduction in country i exports to the US reveals country i
as a complement with China, and in that case the tariff implies a negative demand shock.
10If we followed the same steps with a standard constant-elasticity (CES) demand with substitution parameter σ








(σ− 1) sCH .
Under CES, the tariff elasticity that we estimate would only vary across countries according to the supply slope
parameter and every country would have the same demand substitution with China. As we show below, the estimates
reveal cross-country heterogeneity in demand substitution in China (and the US), including variation in whether
countries sell products that are complements or substitutes.
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TABLE 1: PARAMETER REGIONS GIVEN EXPORT RESPONSES TO US TARIFFS ON CHINA
Country i’s Export Response to US
Decrease Increase
China Complement China Substitute
Increase Upward-Sloping Supply Downward-Sloping Supply
Country i′s σCHi < 0; bi > 0 σCHi > 0; bi < 0
Export
Response
to RW Decrease China Complement China SubstituteDownward- Sloping Supply Upward-Sloping Supply
σCHi < 0; bi < 0 σCHi > 0; bi > 0
Notes: Table shows the parameter regions implied by the export response of country to the US and to the rest of the
world (RW) when the US increases tariffs on China. A similar taxonomy applies for China’s tariffs on the US, in which
case the responses would reveal substitutability with the US (σUSi instead of σCHi).
Suppose next that we are in the China-substitutes case on the right column of Table 1, where
US tariffs on China lead to an increase in exports of country i to the US. As implied by part (ii)
of the proposition, given negatively sloped demand, an increase in exports to countries other
than US reveals downward-sloping supply (bi < 0). In this case, the positive demand shock in
the US market increases supply and lowers the price, leading to an increase in exports to rest of
the world.11 Conversely, a reduction in exports would be consistent with a standard neoclassical
world, where a demand shock to one destination reallocates resources away from others. Similarly,
in the China-complements case, where US tariffs on China lead to a decrease in exports of country
i to the US, the downward-sloping supply is revealed by a reduction in exports to the rest of the
world.
We conclude that a downward-sloping supply (bi < 0) is consistent with observing either an
increase in exports to both the US and the rest of the world, or a decrease to both. Of course, a
similar logic applies when we consider exports to China and to the rest of the world in response to
China’s tariffs on the US. In that case, the pattern of exports to China reveals substitutabilities or
complementarities with US products.
2.3 Specification With All Tariffs
In order to proceed to the empirical analysis, we complete the presentation of the main estimating
equations when all the tariffs are included. As implied by (B.36) in the Appendix, the change in
11In this case, inverse supply is negatively sloped, but less so than demand. As also noted in part (ii) of the
proposition, an increase in exports when σUSi > 0 could also reveal a pathological case in which inverse demand
is positively sloped, and even more so than a positively sloped supply. In this case, the positive demand shock in the
US increases the price of products from i, but because demand is positively sloped then exports increase to countries
other than the US.
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exports from i 6= US,CH to destination n = US,CH,RW is
∆ lnXniω =αnij + βn1i∆ lnTUSCH,ω + βn2i∆ lnTCHUS,ω
+ βn3i∆ lnTUSi,ω + βn4i∆ lnTCHi,ω
+ βn5i ∑
i′ 6=CH,US,i
∆ lnTUSi′,ω + βn6i ∑
i′ 6=CH,US,i
∆ lnTCHi′,ω
+ ηniω + ε
n
iω. (11)
The term βn1i corresponding to the US tariff on China was already presented in (10). The additional
terms are a function of the remaining parameters (σii,σRW ) and of initial expenditure shares, as
shown in (B.38) to (B.42) in Appendix B.2. The second line captures the impacts of the US and
Chinese tariffs on country i, and the third line captures the impacts of changes in the market access
of country i due to the US and Chinese tariffs on other bystander countries besides i. Our previous
assumption (4) implies that the US tariffs on other all other countries enter symmetrically.
The full empirical specification implied by the model in expression (11) includes an additional
term, ηniω, that varies at the product level.
12 This term captures the impact that the tariff-driven
price changes of all the varieties other than iω have on the demand for iω in destination n, after
controlling for the fixed effects. These price changes may lead to differential outcomes by exporter
and product due to exporter-specific bilateral substitution patterns. This component could pose
an identification challenge. However, this effect is weak under reasonable restrictions. Specifically,
ηniω ≈ 0 under: i) vanishing substitution across varieties not originating in the US or China (σRW →
0); and ii) small differences in price changes for US products within each sector, and the same for
China (p̂iω ≈ p̂iω′ for ω,ω′ ∈ Ωj for i = CH,US).13
3 Data and Summary Statistics
This section describes the data sources, presents summary statistics, and provides a visual analysis
of the impacts of the US-China tariffs on global trade.
3.1 Data
We obtain global bilateral trade data from the International Trade Centre (ITC). These data track
monthly trade flows from January 2014 to December 2019 at the HS6 product level. We focus
on long-run outcomes by aggregating into biennial (24-month) intervals (2014/2015; 2016/17;
2018/19). For ease of notation, we refer to each 24-month period by its ending year (and so, for
example, we refer to the 24-month period from 2018-2019 as “2019”). We restrict our sample to the
12See equation (B.37) in Appendix B.2.
13This term also includes tariff-driven changes in country-level expenditures across products ω, after controlling
for importer and sector fixed effects. These residual demand shifts across products would be small if product-level
reallocations are weak within sectors, as it would be the case under Cobb-Douglas demand assumptions across
products.
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top 50 exporting countries (including the US and China), excluding oil exporting countries.14 The
resulting sample covers 95.9% of global trade. We analyze exports from each of these countries
to three destinations, {US,CH,RW}, where RW is an aggregate of all destinations except the US
and China.15 We classify HS6 products into 9 sectors: agriculture, apparel, chemicals, materials,
machinery, metals, minerals, transport, and miscellaneous. Table 2 provides summary statistics on
global exports by sector.
TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Industry Examples USD Share # HS6 Share
Machinery Engines, computers, cell phones 4,817 0.29 894 0.15
Transport Vehicles, airplanes, parts 2,082 0.13 154 0.03
Materials Plastics, lumber, stones, glass 1,891 0.11 802 0.13
Chemicals Medications, cosmetics, vaccines 1,843 0.11 955 0.16
Agriculture Soy beans, wine, coffee, beef 1,491 0.09 1,083 0.18
Minerals Oil, coal, salt, electricity 1,256 0.08 166 0.03
Metals Copper, steel, iron, aluminum 1,148 0.07 601 0.10
Apparel Footwear, t-shirts, hand bags 910 0.05 1,041 0.17
Miscellaneous Medical devices, furniture, art 1,163 0.07 421 0.07
Notes: Table shows the breakdown of pre-war exports (2016-17) by sector. HS6 products classified into 9 sectors.
We consider four sets of tariff changes as part of the US-China trade war. The first set includes
the HS6-level tariff increases imposed by the US on China (the “US tariff”), which following the
framework’s notation we denote as TUSCH,ω, where ω denotes an HS6 product code. The second set
includes the tariff increases imposed by China on the US, TCHUS,ω (the “China tariff”). The third set
includes the product-level tariff changes that the US imposed on each country i other than China,
denoted TUSi,ω ; for example, steel tariffs on Mexico and Europe. These three sets of tariffs are taken
from Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy, and Khandelwal (2020) and extended through the end of
2019.16 The fourth set corresponds to most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff changes implemented by
China and affecting all countries but the US, denoted TCHi,ω . We obtain these tariff changes from
Bown, Jung, and Zhang (2019). We scale tariff changes in proportion to their duration within a
24-month interval such that, for example, a 20% tariff that is implemented for 12 months would
14These countries are: Algeria, Angola, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Norway, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Qatar. Throughout, we measure all trade flows based
on countries’ reported imports rather than reported exports due to more complete country coverage of the former.
15A country’s global exports are therefore the sum of exports to US, CH , and RW . We consider all countries in
the rest of the world as a single destination, RW , because we estimate differential responses to each destination, and it
would be intractable to estimate separate responses to each country within RW .
16The US tariffs are available at the HS10 level. We aggregate the tariffs from the country-monthly-HS10 level to
the country-biennial-HS6 level using pre-trade war export weights, where the weights represent the share of each HS10
variety in total HS6-variety-level exports. China imposed tariffs at the HS8 level, and we collapse to the HS6 level using
pre-trade war export weights from HS8-level China trade data.
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be assigned a tariff rate of 10% = (20%*12/24). This scaling generates variation in tariff changes
across products due to both variation in the magnitude of the rate changes as well as variation in
the timing of when the tariff changes were implemented.17
3.2 Summary Statistics
Figure 1 illustrates the trade war tariff variation between 2017 and 2019. The black dots indicate
the median tariff increase, the boxes denote the 25th and 75th percentiles, and whiskers show the
10th and 90th percentiles.
Panel A illustrates the average tariff change across products imposed by the US on China
(∆ lnTUSCH ) and non-China trade partners (∆ lnTUSi ). With the exception of two sectors – machinery
and metals – the US did not significantly raise tariffs on non-China trade partners. Across all
sectors, however, the US raised tariffs significantly on China. Additionally, there is substantial
variation across products within sectors. This is the variation we exploit in the estimation.
Panel B shows China’s tariff changes. China’s tariffs on the US increased across all sectors.
Moreover, as documented by Bown, Jung, and Zhang (2019), China lowered its tariff rates on
non-US trade partners.
Figure A.1 reports countries’ export shares by sector prior to the trade war. This heterogeneity
in countries’ exports gives natural variation in the impacts of the trade war since the tariffs were
not uniformly increased across sectors.
17Our analysis does not include pre-determined staged tariff changes that went into effect during this period as part
of the trade war tariffs. Bown, Jung, and Zhang (2019) document how China’s MFN tariff cuts were likely influenced
by the trade war with the US, and so we treat these tariff cuts as part of the trade war. However, we exclude other
countries’ retaliatory tariffs on the US from the analysis. This is because we aggregate all destinations other than the US
and China into a singleRW destination, and the retaliatory tariff increases within this aggregated destination are small:
we estimate the average tariff change to be about 0.002 (= 0.2 percentage points) using tariff data from Fajgelbaum,
Goldberg, Kennedy, and Khandelwal (2020). Including these retaliatory tariffs imposed by countries other than the
US and China would come at a high cost in tractability without providing sufficient additional empirical variation for
estimation.
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FIGURE 1: TARIFF CHANGES
Panel A: US Tariff Changes












Panel B: China Tariff Changes












Notes: Figure reports the set of tariff changes imposed by the US (Panel A) and China (Panel B), by sector. The tariff
changes are scaled by total time in effect over the two year window. For example, if the US raised tariffs on a product
from China in September 2018 by 10%, the scaled tariff change over the two year window would be 6.66% = (16/24) ∗
10%. If the tariff of a product went up 25% in September 2019, the scaled tariff change would be 4.16% (= (4/24) ∗ 25%).
The black dots indicate the median tariff increase, the boxes denote the 25th and 75th percentiles, and whiskers show
the 10th and 90th percentiles.
3.3 A First Look at Tariffs and Export Growth
Figure 2 shows a series of binscatter plots, where the y-axes show changes in country-by-product
log exports and the x-axes show changes in tariffs. Each plot contains data points and linear
trend lines from two distinct periods: the 2015-17 period prior to the trade war, and the 2017-19
post-period. The plots in panels A and B, which respectively examine exports from the US to
China and from China to the US, residualize sector fixed effects. The plots in panels C-F, which
examine the exports of bystander countries, residualize country-by-sector fixed effects.18 We
observe broadly flat and statistically insignificant coefficients in the pre-period, suggesting that
targeted and untargeted varieties were on parallel trends prior to the trade war. An exception
is Panel B, where we observe a positive correlation between 2015-17 US export growth and the
2017-19 Chinese tariff changes, and a more modest pre-trend in Panel F. We address potential
concerns with pre-trends in Section 4.
In Panels A and B, we first confirm that trade flows between the US and China declined in
response to the tariffs that each applied against the other, consistent with evidence from several
existing studies (see Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2021)). In the remaining panels, we build on
these results to introduce visual evidence of two novel facts that are suggestive as to how the trade
war tariffs affected bystander countries.
First, the upward-sloping trend line in Panel C shows that, on average, countries in the rest
of the world increased exports to products with high US tariffs on China, and differentially so
compared to the pre-period. However, Panel D shows that these countries did not (differentially)
reallocate exports into China in response to China’s tariffs. Second, Panels E and F show that
bystander countries increased their exports of trade war targeted products to the rest of the world,
providing suggestive evidence of downward-sloping supply curves.
These patterns motivate the systematic empirical investigations in Section 4. There, we provide
evidence that the empirical patterns in Figure 2 are robust to controlling for changes in other tariffs
(such as the tariffs that the US and China imposed on other countries) and pre-existing trends
in export growth. We further show that Panels C-F of Figure 2 mask economically meaningful
country-level heterogeneity in patterns of export reallocation and world export growth.
18Figure A.2 shows that these patterns are also evident in the raw data without fixed effect controls.
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Notes: The panels show binscatter plots of countries’ export growth (on the y-axes) against changes in tariffs due to the
trade war (on the x-axes), after residualizing sector fixed effects (in Panels A and B) or country-sector fixed effects (in
Panels C-F). Below each panel we report the corresponding OLS coefficients (standard errors clustered by product in




Building on the patterns from Section 3.3, we now move to a more systematic empirical
investigation of the effects of the trade war on global trade. Our initial analysis relies on the
following specification, motivated by (11), that estimates how the trade war tariffs affected the
exports of country i to each of three destinations, n = {US,CH,RW}:
∆ lnXniω =αnij + βn1i∆ lnTUSCH,ω + βn2i∆ lnTCHUS,ω + βn3i∆ lnTUSi,ω + βn4i∆ lnTCHi,ω + πni ∆ lnXniω,t−1 + εniω
(12)
In words, equation (12) regresses the 2017 to 2019 log change in exports from country i in product
ω to destination n, ∆ lnXniω, on the log change in tariffs over the same period. For example,
for n = US, we consider how country i’s exports of product ω to the US change in response
to: (i) the US tariff increase on China in that product (∆ lnTUSCH,ω); (ii) China’s tariff increase on
the US (∆ lnTCHUS,ω); (iii) the US tariff increase on exporter i in that product (∆ lnTUSi,ω , which, as
shown before in Panel A of Figure 1, mainly affected countries’ exports of metals to the US); and
(iv) China’s changes in MFN tariffs (∆ lnTCHi,ω , which as shown in Panel B of Figure 1 is mostly
negative, implying improved market access to China for the bystander countries).19 Consistent
with the assumptions underlying the derivation of (11), which is derived for continuing varieties,
this specification is restricted to the intensive margin of exports (that is, it only includes varieties
iω that were exported to n in 2017 and 2019). We discuss extensive margin responses in Section 5.
Each specification includes exporter-by-sector fixed effects, αnij , to control for secular trends
in demand as well as for supply shocks affecting all products within a given country-sector, as
discussed in the previous section. Intuitively, the elasticities are identified from a comparison of
export responses across products within the same sector and exporter. For example, if βUS1i > 0 for
countries i 6= US,CH , then countries in the rest of the world on average increased exports to the
US in products where the US imposed greater tariff changes on China.
The identifying assumption underlying this empirical strategy is that, within country-sectors,
potential outcomes in 2017-19 export growth across products would have been the same in the
absence of the trade war. We can assess the plausibility of this parallel trends assumption by
testing for differential trends in export growth in the years prior to the trade war. We previously
showed evidence in Figure 2 that bystander countries’ pre-war export growth is uncorrelated
with the future changes in tariffs. Table A.1 further probes this evidence with a more systematic
evaluation by regressing lagged exports, ∆ lnXniω,t−1, on the future tariff changes (controlling for
19Our benchmark specifications set βn5i and β
n
6i in (11) to zero. While theoretically justified, the tariff summation
terms that identify these coefficients are highly correlated with the underlying bilateral tariffs from which they are
constructed. I.e., since China changed tariffs on an MFN basis to third countries, the ∑i′ 6=CH,US,i ∆ lnTCHi′,ω term is
∆ lnTCHi,ω times the number of exporters (excluding US, China, and i) in product ω, so βn5 is identified only through
variation in the number of exporters across products. The correlation between ∑i′ 6=CH,US,i ∆ lnTCHi′,ω and ∆ lnT
CH
i,ω is
0.996. A similar issue arises for the ∑i′ 6=CH,US,i ∆ lnTUSi′,ω term because when the US did change tariff rates on third
countries, it often raised rates on by a similar amount. The correlation between ∑i′ 6=CH,US,i ∆ lnTUSi′,ω and ∆ lnT
US
i,ω is
0.852. Section 5.3 examines the full specification and demonstrates that the main results are not sensitive to setting βn5i
and βn6i to zero.
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country-sector fixed effects and clustering by HS6 product). The results suggest pre-trends in 5
of the 12 coefficients. To ensure that these pre-existing trends do not drive our results, our main
specifications directly control for them through the ∆ lnXniω,t−1 term in (12).20
4.1 Export Responses of the US and China
We first estimate (12) for the US and China as exporters.21 Columns 1-2 of Table 3 examine China’s
product-level exports to the US and RW in response to the US-China tariffs, and columns 3-4
examine US’s exports. The main novelty of these two columns is that we consider the impact of
each country’s imports tariffs on its own exports to the other country and to the rest of the world.
Previous papers such as Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019), Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy,
and Khandelwal (2020), Cavallo, Gopinath, Neiman, and Tang (2021) have analyzed the effects of
the US import tariff on the imports from China relative to other origins within products.22
As expected, the US tariffs reduce China’s exports to the US (first row of column 1), with a
βUS1CH elasticity of -1.15 (se 0.25); and the Chinese tariffs reduce US exports to China (second row of
column 3), with a βCH2US elasticity -1.53 (se 0.33). In response to the foreign tariffs, both the US and
China reallocate their exports into the rest of the world (first row of column 2, βRW1CH , and second
row of column 4, βRW2US , which is noisy). Since the foreign tariff is a negative demand shock, this
reallocation into RW implies either infinitely elastic or upward-sloping supplies at the product
level.
The Chinese tariffs also reduce China’s exports to the US (the coefficient βUS2CH in the second
row of column 1) and the US tariffs reduce US exports to CH (the coefficient βCH1US in the first row
of column 3). These results are consistent with two complementary explanations. The first one
is a standard Lerner symmetry effect that arises in our model under standard upward sloping
or infinitely elastic supplies by product, whereby import tariffs act like export taxes. As the US
taxes China and imports from that country fall (as shown above), US demand is reallocated in
part towards domestic varieties, reallocating domestic production away from China. The second
explanation relies on supply chains: if the production of the taxed products requires varieties
of those same products as inputs (i.e., if input-output matrixes are heavy on the diagonal at the
product level) then the US tariff reduces the demand for US products, because the lower Chinese
exports to the US reduces China’s demand for US inputs.23 Both explanations reinforce each other:
20If the pre-trend control is missing due to lack of exports, we set the value to zero and include a missing value
dummy. Section 5.3 shows that our main results are robust to excluding these pre-trend controls.
21Equation (12) corresponds to i 6= US,CH . For the US and China, the model-implied estimating equation has the
same structure except for the terms with coefficients βn3i and β
n
4i which do not appear in the regression.
22Our analysis also unfolds over a longer 2-year horizon than the existing estimates.
23Benguria and Saffie (2019), Flaaen and Pierce (2019), and Handley, Kamal, and Monarch (2020) find that sector-level
export prices rise with US tariffs through rising cost for imported inputs. We do not directly observe the magnitude of
the diagonal at the HS6 product level since China’s input-output matrix are constructed more coarsely. However, we can
check this magnitude in Chinese firm-level customs data for 2005 (the latest year for which we have access), removing
trading companies to focus on manufacturers (using the procedure from Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei, 2011). 30.9%
of exporters import the same HS6 product they export, and these exporters account for 74.7% of total China exports.
Across all firms, the import share of products that are simultaneously imported and exported is on average 17.6%. If we
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the Lerner effect reallocates US demand to US goods, and the value-chain effect shifts demand
away from US goods or supply away from the taxed products. Similar forces on the Chinese side
may explain explain why China’s tariffs reduces its exports to the US, but βUS2CH is not precisely
estimated.
Finally, each country’s own tariffs increase their exports to the rest of the world (second row
of column 2, a noisy βRW2CH , and first row of column 4, a more precise β
RW
1US). To the extent
that they resulted from greater US or Chinese domestic scale stemming from greater protection,
these estimates could be suggestive of a downward-sloping supply.24 However, as we have just
discussed, US and China reallocated into the world in response to the foreign tariff; and, the
greater domestic scale in China and particularly the US led to lower exports to the other country.
These results are broadly suggestive of horizontal or upward-sloping supplies at the product level.
We can reconcile the increase in exports to RW in response to the own tariffs with horizontal or
upward-sloping supplies if, as argued in the previous paragraph, a strong enough value-chain
component led to lower Chinese demand for US goods, and vice-versa. This suggests that standard
Lerner forces may be operating alongside lower demand, leading to lower exports from the US to
China and vice-versa, and to more exports of both countries to RW .
To summarize, columns 1-4 demonstrate three findings. First, US and China exports to each
other fall in response to the foreign tariff, which is consistent with a standard reallocation away
from taxed imports. Second, their exports to each other also fall with their own tariff, which
is consistent with standard horizontal or upward-sloping supply curves at the product level
leading to reallocation towards home production as imports from the targeted country decline (i.e.,
Lerner), and with negative foreign demand shifts if supply chains operate within products. Third,
exports to RW rise (although noisily for China), which is consistent with the negative demand
shock being strong enough to offset the reallocation away from RW due to greater US demand.
4.2 Export Responses of Bystanders (Pooled Specification)
We now examine the export responses of bystander countries (i.e., all countries in the sample
except for the US and China). Here, we pool over these exporters in (12) and estimate common
elasticities across countries, as would be standard. We cluster the standard errors by HS6 product,
which is the level at which our treatment varies (Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and Wooldridge 2017).
restrict attention to single-product exporters, 9.4% of these exporters import the same good they export. These statistics
suggest that the production of Chinese HS6 products indeed use imports in the same category as inputs.
24For the US, this result echoes Breinlich, Leromain, Novy, and Sampson (2021), who show that a reduction in tariff
uncertainty of Chinese exporters to the US, previously shown to increase Chinese exports (Pierce and Schott, 2016;
Handley and Limão, 2017), also led to lower US exports in the most affected sectors.
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TABLE 3: POOLED RESPONSE SPECIFICATIONS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)








i,ω,t ∆ lnXCHi,ω,t ∆ lnXRWi,ω,t
∆TUSCH,ω (β1) -1.15 0.45 -1.31 0.23 0.25 -0.43 0.15
(0.25) (0.18) (0.32) (0.15) (0.09) (0.13) (0.07)
∆TCHUS,ω (β2) -0.22 0.23 -1.53 0.02 -0.09 -0.14 0.33
(0.22) (0.15) (0.33) (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.06)
∆TUSi,ω (β3) -0.61 -0.32 0.20
(0.26) (0.28) (0.15)
∆TCHi,ω (β4) -0.13 -0.80 -0.36
(0.19) (0.31) (0.14)
Pre-trend control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × Sector FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
R2 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.07
N 4,465 5,177 4,094 5,212 99,934 75,948 208,243
Exporters CHN CHN USA USA 48 48 48
Notes: Table reports the coefficients from specification (12). Columns 1-2 examine China’s exports to US and RW .
Columns 3-4 examing US exports to CH and RW . Columns 5-7 examine RW exports to US,CH,RW . Columns 1-4
include sector fixed effects, and columns 5-7 include country-sector fixed effects. All regressions include controls for
pre-existing trends. Standard errors are clustered by product in columns 5-7.
The results are shown in columns 5-7 of Table 3. In the model, exports to RW are mediated by
countries’ exports to US and CH . It is therefore useful to examine bystander exports to the three
destinations for a given tariff by moving across columns 5-7 along a row.
First, consider the response to the US tariff. The first row examines how bystanders’ exports
respond to each destination: βUS1RW , β
CH
1RW , and β
RW
1RW in (12). Consistent with the patterns in Figure
2, column 5 shows that US tariffs increased exports of the targeted product from countries in the
rest of the world to the US by a βUS1RW elasticity of 0.25 (se 0.09). According to Proposition 1,
this result suggests σCH,RW > 0: since the average bystander country is a substitute for Chinese
varieties, the reduced market access for China raises its access to the US. Hence, the typical country
increased exports to the US in the products that the US taxed from China.
Simultaneously, the first row of columns 6 and 7 imply that the typical country lowered exports
to China and increased exports to the rest of the world in the products with higher US tariffs on
China: βCH1RW is -0.43 (se 0.13) and β
RW
1RW is 0.15 (se 0.07). In light of Proposition 1, these results seem
to contradict each other. As countries grow in the US, they should either shrink in both China and
other destinations if there are product-level upward-sloping supplies, or grow in both if there are
product-level downward-sloping supplies. However, as with the US export responses to the US
tariffs, both results are consistent with a (specific form of) value-chain driven reduction in Chinese
demand: even if countries operate under downward-sloping supplies, exports to China of a given
product may fall if China demands less inputs in that same product category as a result of its
shrinking exports to the US.
The second row of columns 5 to 7 shows the βn2RW coefficients for the changes in bystanders’
exports in response to the Chinese tariffs. The export response to China is negative (βCH2RW is -0.14
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(se 0.14). The point estimate suggests that the typical country produces goods that complement
US varieties in China (σRW ,US > 0), but is quite imprecisely estimated. As in the US case, we find
a precisely estimated increase in exports to RW (βRW2RW > 0).25
These patterns are consistent with the descriptive evidence in Section 3.3 and suggest the
following explanation of global reallocations in response to the US-China trade war: the average
country in the rest of the world substitutes China in the US (that is, its exports to US grow with
the US tariffs on China) and complements the US in China (that is, its exports to CH shrink with
the Chinese tariffs on the US, although this effect is imprecisely estimated). The products taxed
by the US (China) operate largely under downward-sloping (upward-sloping) supplies, which
explains the growth in trade from the rest of the world into itself in response to the positive
(negative) demand shock. Therefore, the reallocations triggered by the US-China trade war did
not occur at the expense of exports to other countries. Instead, the US-China trade war created
trade opportunities.
Aggregate Export Responses (Pooled) Using the predicted values from these regressions, we
can aggregate over products and destinations within each exporter to obtain a country-level
increase in exports. An important caveat to these results, as noted earlier, is that they do not
incorporate the potential effect of the tariffs on the exporter-destination-sector fixed effects αnij .
However, as discussed in the context of Proposition 1, they do include the general-equilibrium
impacts corresponding to the change in the price of the varieties exported by country i that clear
international markets, keeping constant the aggregate shifters absorbed by αnij .
We generate the predicted exports using the coefficients from Table 3:















where i = US,CH,RW .26 Next, we aggregate these product-level export responses to the country
level, weighting each variety by its time invariant export share to each destination as follows:
∆̂ lnXni = ∑
ω
λnXiω∆̂ lnXniω (14)
where λnXiω is product ω’s pre-war share of country i’s exports to destination n = US,CH,RW .27
Pre-war specialization therefore drives the variation in exports to each destination.28 Predicted
25If countries operate along downward-sloping supplies, as implied by βUS1 > 0 and βRW1 > 0, then the reduction in
scale due to lower exports to China should lead to less exports to RW. The results can be reconciled if the set of products
taxed by China and the set of products taxed by the US operate with different supply elasticities.
26We use the four tariffs to predict export growth since we consider all four tariffs as part of the trade war. As a
result, it is not necessarily the case that β̂n1i, β̂n2i > 0 implies ̂∆ lnXniω > 0.
27The λnXiω shares are defined as the export values in t− 1 for continuing products divided by total country exports
in t− 1. Section 5 extends the analysis to include the extensive margin.
28An additional source of variation across countries comes from ∆TUSiω , but this will be small relative to differences
in specialization.
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aggregate exports to the world from each country are a weighted average of the (pre-war) export
responses to the three destinations:
̂∆ lnXWDi = ∑
n=US,CH,RW
λnXi∆̂ lnXni (15)
where λnXi is destination n’s share of country i’s exports to the world.
Panel A of Table 4 aggregates the predicted export responses across exporters. This provides
an easier way to digest the large number of coefficients in Table 3 and re-emphasizes the key
takeaways.29
TABLE 4: GLOBAL EXPORT RESPONSES
Panel A: Pooled Specifications
from ↓/to→ US CH RW World
US -26.3% 2.2% -0.9%
(3.9%) (1.9%) (1.8%)
CH -8.5% 5.5% 1.8%
(2.7%) (5.5%) (4.1%)
RW 1.1% -4.7% 4.8% 3.2%
(1.0%) (1.5%) (1.0%) (0.7%)
World -1.2% -7.3% 4.6% 2.5%
(1.1%) (1.4%) (1.1%) (0.8%)
Panel B: Heterogenous Specifications
from ↓/to→ US CH RW World
US -26.3% 2.2% -0.9%
(3.9%) (1.9%) (1.8%)
CH -8.5% 5.5% 1.8%
(2.7%) (5.5%) (4.1%)
RW 2.0% -4.2% 5.4% 3.8%
(1.2%) (1.3%) (0.6%) (0.5%)
World -0.5% -6.9% 5.0% 3.0%
(1.1%) (1.3%) (1.0%) (0.7%)
Notes: Table shows the breakdown of predicted aggregate export growth from US and China and bystander countries to
US,CH,RW and WD. Panel A shows the results from using the pooled responses reported in Table 3. Panel B shows
the results from using the heterogenous responses reported in Tables A.2-A.4 that vary across bystander countries.
Exports to WD are weighted averages of exports to each destination, also as discussed in the text. Bootstrapped
standard errors reported in parentheses.
First, the trade war reduced US exports to China by 26.3% (se 3.9%) and raised exports to RW
by 2.2% (se 1.9%). On net, US exports to the world do not change much, falling by a statistically
insignificant 0.9% (se 1.8%). We observe a similar pattern for China: aggregate exports to US
decline by 8.5% (se 2.7%), rise to RW by an imprecise 5.5% (se 5.5%), and are also statistically flat
29We construct bootstrapped standard errors to each aggregate response by block bootstrapping specifications (12).
We sample with replacement within country-sector pairs, estimate the specifications in (12), construct the aggregate
predicted exports to the each estimation using (13)-(15), and repeating 100 times.
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to the world, 1.8% (se 4.1%).30
Second, we find that the rest of the world’s exports increase to the US but decline toCH . Third,
on net, the rest of the world exports to RW respond strongly, increasing by 4.8% (se 1.0%). This
large response for the rest of world drives an overall net increase in global trade by 2.5% (se 0.8%).
4.3 Export Responses of Bystanders (Heterogenous Specification)
We now relax the homogenous response assumption among bystander countries, and estimate
heterogeneous tariff responses across countries. This is a substantially more flexible specification
since it allows for a country-specific response to each tariff. We implement this by estimating
(12) separately for each country i to each destination n. The specifications include sector fixed
effects, thus the identifying variation continues to leverage variation across products within
country-sectors.
Tables A.2-A.4 report the coefficients for each regression. We find large variation across
countries within the rest of the world in how product-level exports grew to the US, CH , and the
RW in response to the US-China tariffs. In response to the US tariffs imposed on China, countries’
export elasticity to the US range from -1.43 to 1.61 (sd 0.62). The analog export elasticity to CH in
response to China’s tariffs imposed on the US ranges from -2.81 to 1.42 (sd 0.88).
Given the large number of coefficients, it is helpful to visualize and interpret the coefficients
through the taxonomy in Table 1. The results also reveal heterogeneity in the precision of these
coefficients across countries and tariffs which are difficult to summarize, but will be addressed
below when discussing the aggregation of these coefficients. For now, we simply focus on the
signs of these coefficients.







. As implied by Table 1, the NE quadrant displays the
countries that have downward-sloping supply curves and are substitutes with US and CH .
Countries that lie in this quadrant are likely “winners” from the trade war since their exports
to US or CH increase, as would their exports to RW . The NW quadrant displays the countries
that have upward-sloping supply curves and export products that are complements with US and
CH . Countries in this quadrant reduce their exports to US or CH but exports to RW would
increase. The SE quadrant displays the countries that have upward-sloping supply curves and
are substitutes with US and CH . Countries in this quadrant increase their exports to US or CH
but exports to RW would decline. Finally, the SW quadrant displays the countries that have
downward-sloping supply curves and are complements with US and CH . Countries that lie in
this quadrant decrease their exports to all three destinations and emerge as likely “losers” from
the trade war.
30The estimated response elasticities and this overall change in exports are consistent with horizontal product-level
export supply curves for the US and China and with the complete pass-through documented by previous studies (see
Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2021) for a review): the US-China tariffs reduced mutual exports in the taxed products,
but each country could reallocate trade to other destinations with little change in exports to the world.
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FIGURE 3: PATTERNS OF SCALE AND SUBSTITUTION
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from estimating (12) to US and RW . Panel B plots the coefficients(
β̂US2i , β̂RW2i
)
from estimating (12) to CH and RW . The text in each quadrant is from Table 1.
Panel A of Figure 3 shows that most countries lie to the right of the vertical line at zero,
indicative that they are identified as substitutes with China. Consider Mexico, Malaysia, and
Thailand. These three countries lie in the NW quadrant, indicating that the US tariff raised their
exports to both US and RW . Now consider Spain versus France. Both countries have a similar
β̂US1i magnitude (hence a similar substitution with Chinese goods), but opposite β̂
RW
1i signs (hence
different scale effects). As these two countries have similar specialization patterns (see Figure A.1),
similar responses to the US implies their exports to the US would increase by a similar amount due
to the US tariffs; however, Spain’s exports to theUS come at the expense of its exports toRW , while
France’s exports to both destinations would increase. Finally, South Africa and the Philippines lie
in the SW quadrant, since their exports to both US and RW fall with the tariff.




responses. Consider again Mexico, Malaysia and
Thailand. Mexico and Thailand remain in the NE quadrant. But in contrast to Panel A, Malaysia
lies in the NW quadrant with respect to the ∆ lnTCHUS,ω tariff. So, while their exports to the US
increased (revealing itself to be substitutes with Chinese products), they experience a decline in
exports to China (revealing itself to be complements with US products). France and Spain, which
fell in different quadrants for the US tariff, now lie in the same NE quadrant with respect to China’s
tariff. Comparing Panel A and Panel B, it is possible that a country reveals opposite signs for
β̂RW1i and β̂
RW
2i . The overall impact of exports to RW depends on the relative magnitude of the
coefficients and the underlying patterns of specializations.
The key message from these regressions and figure is that allowing for country-specific
response reveals heterogeneity in the substitution patterns with respect to US and Chinese
varieties, and the potential scale implications across countries. We now show that this
heterogeneity in responses generates substantial heterogeneity in predicted export growth.
Aggregate Export Responses (Heterogenous) We can again predict export responses and
construct overall impacts of the tariffs on countries’ exports using (13), but now using the full
heterogeneity of the responses. As noted in footnote 26, we predict the export responses using
all four tariffs, so it is possible that a country’s exports to the world to decline even if it in the
North-east quadrant in both panels in Figure 3.
Figure 4 plots aggregate predicted export responses for the three destinations by country
(sorted by the aggregate predicted response to the entire world).31
31We report bootstrapped confidence intervals for ̂∆ lnXWDi . These are constructed by implementing (12) on 100
bootstrap samples, constructing (13) for each bootstrap run, and taking the standard deviation. Below, we further
obtain bootstrapped standard errors for aggregate world trade that aggregates across countries’ predicted responses to
the three destinations.
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Predicted Exports to US
Predicted Exports to CH
Predicted Exports to RW
Predicted Exports to WD
Notes: The figure plots changes in predicted exports to each destination. Bootstrapped error bars denote 90%
confidence intervals. These bands are constructed by implementing (12) on 100 bootstrap samples (with replacement)
and calculating countries’ aggregate response from (13).
The figure reveals two messages. First, there is variation across countries in the impact of
the trade war on export: on average, countries’ exports to the world increase by 3.1%, which
is similar to the average response in the homogeneous specification, but with a large standard
deviation of 4.4% (compared to 1.3% from the homogenous specification). Second, this variation
is driven by the heterogeneous responses, rather by than differences in countries’ export baskets.
To further see this, Figure 5 plots the predicted winners from the pooled specification against
the predicted winners from the heterogenous regression. Recall that the only variation from the
pooled specification stems from differences in specialization patterns, while the predictions from
the heterogenous regression also reflect variation in tariff elasticities across countries. The figure
reveals much larger variation from this more flexible specification, and hence reveals substantially
heterogeneous responses of bystander countries to the trade war tariffs. When accounting for
standard errors around this prediction, we estimate that the trade war increased world exports for
19 countries and reduced exports for 1 country. We cannot reject that the trade war had no impact
for the remaining 28 of the 48 bystander countries.
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Winners from heterogenous specification
Notes: Figure reports the predicted exports to WD estimated in the pooled specification (y-axis) and heterogenous
specification (x-axis, taken from Figure 4).
What explains the pattern of global export responses from the trade war? Figure A.3 reports the
results of regressing the predicted aggregate export growth, ̂∆ lnXWDi , on (normalized) country
characteristics: distance to the US; distance to China; per capita GDP; GDP; the World Bank’s
2017-18 labor market efficiency index; FDI stock in 2017 from the Financial Times FDI Markets
Database and Refinitiv; the share of exports covered by bilateral “deep” trade agreements as
defined in Mattoo, Rocha, and Ruta (2020); and, the World Bank’s doing business trade score.
These characteristics capture variation in countries by geography (distance), size and income
(GDP, GDPPC), efficiency and flexibility of operating businesses (labor market efficiency, doing
business), and two measures of deeper trade and market integrations (FDI, trade agreements). The
first three sets of characteristics are not significantly correlated with export growth from the trade
war. However, the two measures of deeper integration are more precisely estimated. Countries
with higher FDI stocks and a larger share of exports covered by trade agreements responded
with stronger export growth as a result of the trade war. One possible interpretation is that trade
agreements reduce fixed costs for exporters to expand in foreign markets and/or offset uncertainty
generated by the trade war. Higher FDI stocks may proxy for greater social, political, and economic
ties to foreign markets that may also facilitate export expansion.
When further aggregating country-specific responses globally in Panel B of Table 4, the patterns
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remain quite similar to Panel A (which is generated from the pooled responses). We continue
to observe that bystander countries in aggregate raised exports to the US, lowered exports to
CH , and strongly raised exports to RW . On net, the heterogenous specifications reveal that net
global trade increased by 3.0% (se 0.7%). Thus, this procedure reveals that the trade war increased
aggregate global trade rather than simply reshuffling trade flows across destinations.
5 Additional Results and Robustness
This section further examines export responses, and examines sensitivity to various robustness
checks.
5.1 Prices
Through the lens of the model, countries in the rest of the world increase exports to the rest of the
world through downward-sloping supplies and lower prices. To investigate this mechanism, we
examine price responses, as measured by unit values, to the world using the following regression
estimated, separately by country:
∆ ln piω =αij + β1i∆ lnTUSCH,ω + β2i∆ lnTCHUS,ω + β3i∆ lnTUSi,ω + β4i∆ lnTCHi,ω + εiω, (16)
where piω is the global export price of product ω by exporter i. We examine a global export price,
constructed as the ratio of world export values divided by world export quantities, since the model
assumes that price changes by origin-product are common across all destinations. The results are
reported in Table A.5.
As before, we can aggregate the predicted responses to the country level using the estimated β’s
from (16). In our framework, countries that are classified as demand substitutes to US and China
(because their exports to China and US increase with the tariffs, respectively) receive a positive
demand shock from the tariffs. If these countries also increase their exports to the rest of world,
they are interpreted to be operating along downward-sloping supply curves, and their export
prices should fall. The estimates in Panels A and B of Figure 3 indicate that 8 countries would be
classified in this region of the parameter space (that is, the North-East quadrant of Table 1) for both
the US and China tariffs.
Figure A.4 plots the predicted price responses against the predicted export responses (from
Figure 4), and highlights in blue those 8 countries. For these countries, the response is often
negative and there is a negative relationship between predicted export growth and price declines.
For the other 42 countries, the model-predicted price responses are ambiguous, since the forces
of substitution and scale may offset one another or because the patterns may be different to
each destination. Consistent with this prediction, for these countries we do not observe a clear
relationship between predicted export growth and changes in unit values.
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5.2 Extensive Margin
Our main analysis sample is comprised of continuing varieties—that is, varieties that were
exported to a given destination in both 2017 and 2019. On average across countries, these varieties
account for 99.7% of total exports across countries. Therefore, continuing products dominate
countries’ trade and aggregate responses over the horizon we examine. For a more complete
understanding of how the trade war tariffs affected global trade, we analyze the extensive margin
responses.
To do so, we consider the following linear probability regressions that projects entry and exit





1i∆ lnTUSCH,ω + βn2i∆ lnTCHUS,ω + βn3i∆ lnTUSi,ω + βn4i∆ lnTCHi,ω + εniω (17)
where χniω = EN
n




iω for the exit margin. We define the entry
margin among potential entrants (iω varieties that did not export in t− 1 to n) as a dummy variable
ENniω that switches on for varieties that appear in t. We define the exit margin among potential
exiters (iω varieties that exported in t− 1 to n) as a dummy variable EXniω that switches on for
varieties that disappear in t. For countries in the rest of the world, we cluster the regressions by
product.
Panel A of Table A.6 reports the entry and exit results for the US and China. The overall
pattern suggests two findings. First, although as shown before the tariffs reduced the export
values of continuing products between US and China, we observe that net entry rates between
these countries increased with the tariffs. Second, the increase in US and China’s exports to RW
documented above is also complemented by an increase in net entry to RW .
Panel B of Table A.6 reports entry and exit results for RW . Exporters from bystanders on
average increase entry to the US with the US-China tariffs (column 1) and have slightly lower exit
rates (column 2), suggesting an increase in net entry to the US market. Columns 3-4 examine entry
and exit to China. We previously showed that RW, on average, reduced exports of continuing
products to China. However, columns 3-4 indicate a positive net entry response. Finally, columns
5-6 indicate an increase in net entry into the RW market. Thus, the overall message of Panel B is
that the trade war increased net entry into the three destinations for the average variety exported
from RW . This pattern reinforces the key finding that the trade war increase RWs’ exports to RW .
Since continuing products account for the vast share of exports, including the extensive margin
in the aggregation exercise performed above does not overturn the main findings. To demonstrate
this, we obtain the predicted entry and exit rates from running heterogenous country-by-country
versions of (17). We aggregate to form an overall contribution of the entry margin by weighting
the predicted probabilities of potential entrants by the average export value (for each country)
in t = 1. The overall contribution of the exit margin is analogously computed by weighing the
predicted exit probabilities by the values of potential exiters in t = 0. We then add the entry and
subtract the exit aggregates to Panel B of Table 4 (which used the weights of continuing products)
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to form the overall trade response in Table A.7. For the US and China aggregates, including the
contributions of the extensive margin does not meaningfully change the predicted export shares
to the three destinations. For rest of the world, the exports to China fall by slightly less than the
prediction using solely the continuing products. But, the key takeaway obtained from intensive
margin analysis remain qualitatively the same: keeping the fixed effects of the regression constant,
the trade war increased overall world trade by 3.1%.
5.3 Additional Robustness Checks
In Table 5 we show that our main result that bystander countries increase exports to the world
in response to the trade war tariffs is robust to a battery of alternate estimation and specification
choices. Column 1 shows the benchmark specification (the same as column 7 from Table 3); column
2 winsorizes the top and bottom 1% of the outcomes; column 3 removes the pre-trend control;
columns 4-7 respectively use country-by-HS2, industry, country, and no fixed fixed effects; column
8 estimates responses using only tariffs imposed by the US and China on each other; and column
9 controls for changes in other countries’ market access due to the trade war (that is, includes
estimates of β5 and β6 from (11)). Across all specifications, the US-CH and CH-US tariff coefficients
are stable and precisely estimated.
TABLE 5: ROBUSTNESS: REST OF WORLD TO RW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆ lnXRWi,ω,t ∆ lnXRWi,ω,t ∆ lnXRWi,ω,t ∆ lnXRWi,ω,t ∆ lnXRWi,ω,t ∆ lnXRWi,ω,t ∆ lnXRWi,ω,t ∆ lnXRWi,ω,t ∆ lnXRWi,ω,t
∆TUSCH,ω (β1) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.15
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
∆TCHUS,ω (β2) 0.33 0.33 0.27 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.32
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
∆TUSi,ω (β3) 0.20 0.20 0.30 -0.29 0.24 0.57 0.63 0.10
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.20)
∆TCHi,ω (β4) -0.36 -0.36 -0.25 0.37 -0.34 0.14 0.15 5.42
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (3.71)
∑i′ 6={i,US,CH} ∆ lnTUSi′,ω (β5) 0.00
(0.01)
∑i′ 6={i,US,CH} ∆ lnTCHi,ω (β6) -0.12
(0.08)
Pre-trend control Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects cty-ind9 cty-ind9 cty-ind9 cty-hs2 ind9 cty none cty-ind9 cty-ind9
Winsorized No Yes No No No No No No No
R2 .066 .066 .012 .098 .054 .06 .052 .066 .066
N 208,243 208,243 208,243 208,230 208,243 208,243 208,243 208,243 208,243
Exporters 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Notes: Table shows alternate specifications that estimate the effect of the trade war tariffs on bystander countries’
exports to RW. Column 1 is the benchmark specification (identical to column 7 of Table 3). Column 2 winsorizes
the top and bottom 1% of the outcomes. Column 3 removes the pre-trend control. Columns 4-7 respectively use
country-by-HS2, industry, country, and no fixed fixed effects. Column 8 estimates responses using only tariffs imposed
by the US and China on each other, and column 9 controls for changes in other countries’ export market access (i.e.,
estimates β5 and β6 from equation 11).
In Appendix C.1, we present a complementary analysis and discussion of results using an
instrumental variables estimation approach in which we instrument exports to RW with exports
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to the US and China. While the identifying assumptions necessary for unbiased IV estimation are
unlikely to strictly hold in our setting due to violations of the monotonicity assumption, we view
the evidence as broadly consistent with our main results.
Our approach has assumed that responses vary by country. In Appendix C.2, we implement
regressions that allow export responses to be sector-specific, but common across countries.
The analysis reveals substantially greater variance in predicted export growth due to country
heterogeneity relative to sector heterogeneity. That is, if demand and supply elasticities are
allowed to be sector-specific, differences in specialization patterns across sectors do not go
nearly as far in generating differential export responses across countries as when we allow for
country-specific elasticities. Hence, country-specific demand and supply elasticities, rather than
specialization patterns coupled with sector-specific elasticities, are the main driver of international
differences in export growth from the trade war.
6 Conclusion
The US-China trade war raised concerns that the era of global trade growth would come to an end.
Our results provide little support for this view, at least for the medium-run time horizon that is the
focus of our analysis. Indeed, trade between the two largest economies, the US and China, declined
significantly. However, we also find that trade among indirectly affected bystander countries, as
well as trade between these countries and the US, increased substantially. As a result, global trade
increased in the products targeted by the tariffs. Rather than merely reallocating global trade flows,
the trade war appears to have created new trade opportunities for many countries.
A natural focus for future research would be to explore the forces driving countries’
heterogenous substitution patterns and supply responses. While the product-level global trade
data that we have used are useful to uncover broad reallocation patterns, firm-level data would
be valuable to explore the underlying micro-economic forces—such as firm investments, supply
chain reallocations, and entry and exit—driving these country-specific elasticities. We anticipate
further research on these mechanisms when the appropriate data becomes available.
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Notes: Figure reports countries’ pre-war export shares by sector.
32











0 .05 .1 .15 .2
∆ T(US,CH)
2015-17 2017-19
Pre-period: β=-0.12 (0.27). Post-period: β=-1.06 (0.25).
Panel A














0 .05 .1 .15 .2
∆ T(CH,US)
2015-17 2017-19
Pre-period: β=0.90 (0.40). Post-period: β=-2.01 (0.35).
Panel B










0 .05 .1 .15 .2
∆ T(US,CH)
2015-17 2017-19
Pre-period: β=-0.05 (0.10). Post-period: β=0.24 (0.08).
Panel C











0 .05 .1 .15 .2
∆ T(CH,US)
2015-17 2017-19
Pre-period: β=0.03 (0.16). Post-period: β=-0.03 (0.16).
Panel D












0 .05 .1 .15 .2
∆ T(US,CH)
2015-17 2017-19
Pre-period: β=-0.21 (0.06). Post-period: β=0.35 (0.06).
Panel E











0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
∆ T(CH,US)
2015-17 2017-19
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Panel F
Bystanders' Exports to RW
Notes: The panels show binscatter plots of countries’ export growth (on the y-axes) against changes in tariffs due to the
trade war (on the x-axes). Unlike Figure 2, these figures do not control for fixed effects. Below each panel we report the
corresponding OLS coefficients (standard errors are clustered by product in Panels C-F).
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Notes: The figure plots the coefficients of a regression of ̂∆ lnXWDi on (normalized) country characteristics. Error bars
denote 90% confidence intervals.
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Log Predicted Exports
Countries in both NE quadrants: β=-0.31 (0.13) N=2. Countries not in both NE quandrants: β=0.06 (0.13) N=42.
Notes: The figure plots the predicted export responses from Figure 4 against the predicted export prices formed from
running (16) separately by country and aggregating to the country level. The blue countries are those that appear in the
northeast quadrant of both Panels A and B of Figure 3.
TABLE A.1: LAGGED EXPORTS AND TARIFF CHANGES
(1) (2) (3)
∆ lnXUSi,ω,t−1 ∆ lnXCHi,ω,t−1 ∆ lnXRWi,ω,t−1
∆TUSCH,ω (β1) -0.07 -0.59 -0.08
(0.10) (0.13) (0.07)
∆TCHUS,ω (β2) -0.02 0.10 0.15
(0.10) (0.15) (0.05)
∆TUSi,ω (β3) 0.42 -0.38 -0.32
(0.31) (0.40) (0.18)
∆TCHi,ω (β4) -0.69 -0.52 -0.28
(0.21) (0.32) (0.14)
Country × Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No No
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02
N 97,596 74,827 208,274
Exporters 48 48 48
Notes: Table reports regresses bystanders’ lagged exports on future tariff changes to US (column 1), CH (column 2),
and RW (column 3). Each regression includes country-sector fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by product.
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ARG 0.97 -0.85 28.24 -3.18 998 IRL 0.68 -1.11 2.11 1.91 1,510
(0.72) (0.62) (46.97) (1.90) (0.63) (0.66) (3.38) (1.63)
AUS -0.17 0.68 10.29 0.94 2,271 ISR -0.14 -0.10 -1.29 0.39 2,063
(0.47) (0.46) (22597.93) (1.13) (0.52) (0.53) (3.65) (1.00)
AUT 0.15 0.06 -2.53 1.28 2,286 ITA 0.32 -0.22 -0.74 -0.29 3,802
(0.51) (0.58) (1.28) (1.29) (0.32) (0.31) (1.14) (0.56)
BEL 0.48 0.40 0.97 1.18 2,667 JPN -0.35 -0.18 -0.80 -1.03 3,787
(0.50) (0.51) (1.17) (1.28) (0.28) (0.38) (0.77) (0.70)
BGR 0.41 1.18 7.87 2.53 1,034 KOR -0.09 -0.19 -0.97 -0.31 3,277
(0.90) (0.93) (5.54) (1.27) (0.39) (0.35) (2.46) (0.69)
BRA 0.06 -0.35 5.47 0.10 2,506 MAR -0.55 -1.01 -5.65 -1.71 687
(0.46) (0.49) (3.32) (1.04) (1.16) (0.94) (3.32) (1.74)
CAN 0.35 -0.37 -0.86 -0.26 4,264 MEX 0.96 0.20 -0.47 0.16 3,583
(0.28) (0.23) (0.51) (0.60) (0.38) (0.31) (0.96) (0.69)
CHE 0.71 -0.47 2.65 -2.35 2,624 MYS 1.61 0.06 -1.42 2.30 1,782
(0.45) (0.45) (2.28) (1.11) (0.67) (0.69) (2.07) (1.55)
CHL 1.12 -0.51 -27.21 -1.19 908 NLD 0.42 0.42 0.74 -1.38 3,069
(0.89) (0.62) (44.72) (1.81) (0.42) (0.42) (1.08) (0.93)
CHN -1.15 -0.22 4,465 NZL -0.12 -0.09 -5.13 -2.29 1,375
(0.24) (0.23) (0.68) (0.58) (2.03) (1.70)
COL -0.01 1.57 -1.91 -1.61 1,410 PER -0.36 0.57 3.59 -1.22 1,088
(0.65) (0.52) (2.18) (1.33) (0.95) (0.61) (7.81) (1.21)
CZE 0.98 0.14 2.23 -1.65 1,907 PHL -0.09 -0.33 -0.47 0.13 1,402
(0.59) (0.68) (1.94) (1.37) (0.67) (0.55) (3.17) (1.34)
DEU 0.50 0.09 -1.79 -0.38 3,999 POL 0.43 -0.89 5.79 -0.58 2,222
(0.32) (0.34) (0.58) (0.68) (0.59) (0.53) (2.04) (1.09)
DNK 0.97 -0.04 1.09 0.87 2,003 PRT 0.67 -1.46 -0.46 -1.69 1,660
(0.48) (0.64) (2.18) (1.18) (0.56) (0.55) (3.04) (1.17)
ECU -1.06 0.73 22.29 -0.20 707 ROU 0.19 -0.29 1.45 -2.18 1,131
(1.00) (0.85) (7.13) (1.70) (0.83) (0.85) (2.86) (1.70)
EGY 0.04 -0.34 4.70 -1.43 696 SGP -0.08 -0.71 1.33 2.17 1,550
(1.04) (1.10) (2.71) (1.74) (0.71) (0.78) (3.66) (1.91)
ESP 0.27 0.17 -0.60 -1.59 3,217 SVK 0.00 -0.56 -3.46 0.07 1,053
(0.40) (0.43) (1.36) (0.82) (0.77) (0.88) (2.35) (2.17)
FIN 0.80 -0.56 -2.08 1.94 1,465 SVN -0.55 -1.08 -0.74 0.61 1,013
(0.64) (0.75) (1.73) (1.74) (0.78) (1.09) (2.34) (2.14)
FRA 0.11 -0.21 0.02 -0.67 3,645 SWE -0.51 0.82 0.33 -0.98 2,220
(0.30) (0.35) (0.84) (0.61) (0.38) (0.54) (0.72) (1.36)
GBR -0.00 0.15 -2.70 0.39 3,815 THA 0.18 -0.04 1.51 1.51 2,388
(0.35) (0.40) (0.79) (0.78) (0.50) (0.52) (1.93) (0.78)
GRC 0.90 0.09 0.72 -1.75 1,011 TUR -0.64 -0.08 -4.16 1.90 2,397
(0.86) (0.74) (3.75) (1.38) (0.49) (0.46) (1.33) (0.96)
HKG -0.19 -0.84 -1.40 -1.55 2,380 UKR -1.43 1.28 1.84 0.17 809
(0.51) (0.46) (3.11) (0.92) (0.89) (0.88) (2.72) (1.42)
HUN 0.74 -0.16 0.30 0.81 1,383 USA
(0.68) (0.73) (1.86) (1.58)
IDN -0.24 0.60 1.52 0.79 1,801 VNM 0.14 0.21 -0.16 1.34 2,038
(0.65) (0.58) (2.41) (0.95) (0.59) (0.51) (1.13) (0.98)
IND 0.80 -0.27 -3.95 1.78 3,582 ZAF -0.39 -0.62 2.19 -1.66 1,449
(0.43) (0.37) (1.14) (0.83) (0.64) (0.59) (1.79) (1.71)
Notes: Table reports coefficients from running (12) on exports to the US separately for each country. Each regression
includes pre-trend controls and sector fixed effects.
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ARG -0.38 -0.48 0.44 3.20 353 IRL -1.39 0.38 4.99 -2.63 775
(1.58) (1.37) (67.96) (7.71) (1.05) (1.08) (5.57) (2.88)
AUS -0.63 0.44 -1.62 -2.40 2,084 ISR -0.10 -1.09 -6.64 -3.61 1,112
(0.61) (0.62) (4.66) (1.66) (0.87) (1.02) (6.15) (2.61)
AUT -0.30 -1.03 2.11 -1.61 1,863 ITA -0.33 0.48 0.26 -1.64 3,338
(0.61) (0.73) (1.60) (1.93) (0.36) (0.39) (1.24) (0.81)
BEL -0.11 -0.29 0.22 -0.90 2,070 JPN -0.77 -0.29 0.24 -3.76 3,978
(0.57) (0.64) (1.76) (1.69) (0.30) (0.37) (0.64) (0.72)
BGR -1.26 0.67 -14.70 4.01 704 KOR 0.33 -0.74 -0.39 -0.74 3,498
(1.39) (1.20) (15.89) (2.38) (0.48) (0.53) (2.10) (1.03)
BRA 0.35 -0.81 -3.00 -1.33 1,206 MAR 1.37 -0.90 16.49 -4.66 426
(0.84) (0.99) (5.19) (2.34) (2.13) (1.71) (9166.58) (3.73)
CAN -0.92 -0.54 2.52 -3.72 2,204 MEX 1.15 0.15 -2.85 0.86 1,531
(0.56) (0.64) (1.28) (1.25) (0.73) (0.79) (1.57) (2.12)
CHE -0.28 -0.55 2.77 -0.11 2,172 MYS 1.26 -0.78 -5.04 -0.03 1,924
(0.43) (0.63) (1.51) (1.54) (0.66) (0.68) (2.45) (1.78)
CHL 0.34 -0.43 -3.10 2.44 326 NLD -1.09 0.20 1.09 -3.86 2,367
(1.88) (0.82) (136.20) (3.38) (0.47) (0.54) (2.15) (1.40)
CHN NZL -0.56 0.36 3.54 -0.22 958
(0.94) (0.87) (12.44) (2.41)
COL 0.58 -1.83 -9.57 209 PER 0.13 -0.99 -1297.54 -0.66 253
(2.54) (2.97) (6.77) (2.06) (1.11) (554.64) (3.84)
CZE 0.24 -1.45 -2.37 3.37 1,507 PHL -2.10 -1.63 4.63 2.37 1,102
(0.70) (0.83) (2.66) (2.03) (1.04) (0.93) (4.88) (1.94)
DEU -0.83 -0.09 0.19 -2.08 3,699 POL -0.16 -0.69 -6.69 2.08 1,632
(0.32) (0.36) (0.65) (0.90) (0.79) (0.87) (3.05) (1.84)
DNK -0.49 0.92 0.05 -1.72 1,642 PRT -1.43 -0.19 -2.70 0.94 1,200
(0.58) (0.69) (3.42) (1.82) (0.92) (1.00) (5.05) (1.93)
ECU -0.57 -0.83 -525.74 1.48 105 ROU -0.22 0.91 -6.53 0.09 971
(3.31) (2.40) (267.84) (7.91) (1.07) (1.16) (3.07) (2.28)
EGY -2.80 0.86 -15.16 1.97 326 SGP -0.45 0.48 2.76 2.48 1,730
(2.07) (1.80) (105.67) (3.07) (0.64) (0.76) (2.32) (1.85)
ESP -1.41 0.82 1.07 1.02 2,571 SVK -1.04 -1.28 2.89 3.52 842
(0.50) (0.58) (1.87) (1.04) (0.99) (1.24) (3.92) (3.07)
FIN -0.42 -0.60 1.09 4.03 1,257 SVN -1.20 0.64 -3.84 2.29 837
(0.69) (0.95) (2.41) (2.28) (0.99) (1.35) (3.32) (2.25)
FRA -1.11 0.32 -0.21 -1.97 3,212 SWE 0.10 -0.43 1.10 -0.03 1,826
(0.39) (0.49) (1.22) (0.95) (0.52) (0.68) (1.18) (1.74)
GBR -0.86 0.13 -0.85 -2.69 3,046 THA -0.56 0.41 -0.68 0.49 2,363
(0.41) (0.52) (1.31) (1.08) (0.59) (0.59) (1.88) (1.23)
GRC 1.18 -2.81 -22.52 3.63 543 TUR 1.02 1.42 -0.90 -2.01 1,662
(1.49) (1.35) (12.63) (2.31) (0.69) (0.75) (2.45) (1.47)
HKG -1.24 1.37 -1.51 -2.40 1,837 UKR -4.35 -1.61 5.00 3.65 539
(0.79) (0.92) (3.87) (1.67) (1.53) (1.45) (6.07) (3.56)
HUN -1.40 -0.49 -2.01 0.47 1,139 USA -1.31 -1.53 4,094
(0.93) (1.03) (6.90) (2.25) (0.30) (0.32)
IDN 0.81 -0.64 3.12 -0.92 1,838 VNM -0.71 -0.49 -4.39 -0.18 1,903
(0.77) (0.69) (3.33) (1.38) (0.73) (0.59) (2.59) (1.35)
IND 0.46 -0.72 -5.05 -1.09 2,488 ZAF 1.69 0.06 1.94 1.66 780
(0.61) (0.63) (1.53) (1.44) (1.04) (1.06) (1.86) (2.53)
Notes: Table reports coefficients from running (12) on exports to the CH separately for each country. Each regression
includes pre-trend controls and sector fixed effects.
















ARG -0.63 0.97 7.19 -0.68 3,573 IRL 0.42 0.04 1.68 -0.33 4,221
(0.37) (0.41) (1.79) (0.90) (0.31) (0.30) (1.75) (0.70)
AUS -0.60 0.61 -1.74 -1.38 4,594 ISR -0.20 -0.33 -1.54 -0.68 3,725
(0.30) (0.23) (1.94) (0.61) (0.37) (0.38) (2.03) (0.68)
AUT -0.12 0.47 0.29 -0.61 4,888 ITA 0.18 0.27 -0.25 -0.43 5,117
(0.21) (0.21) (0.38) (0.43) (0.19) (0.15) (0.30) (0.30)
BEL 0.66 0.29 -0.27 -0.10 5,078 JPN -0.08 0.70 -0.71 -0.13 4,900
(0.21) (0.19) (0.43) (0.38) (0.21) (0.23) (0.33) (0.49)
BGR -0.00 -0.28 0.06 -0.26 4,344 KOR 0.08 0.28 1.56 0.94 4,670
(0.32) (0.24) (1.20) (0.66) (0.28) (0.27) (1.39) (0.61)
BRA 0.48 -0.05 0.17 -1.62 4,400 MAR 2.13 -1.09 -1.34 0.57 2,892
(0.28) (0.28) (1.81) (0.58) (0.40) (0.38) (2.99) (0.92)
CAN -0.34 0.64 -0.39 -0.27 4,494 MEX 0.80 0.02 -1.17 1.37 4,280
(0.26) (0.32) (0.79) (0.65) (0.32) (0.27) (0.83) (0.58)
CHE -0.13 0.53 -0.26 -0.03 4,695 MYS 0.68 0.26 0.41 0.63 4,532
(0.25) (0.31) (0.91) (0.60) (0.31) (0.29) (0.97) (0.75)
CHL 0.28 -0.38 -2.00 -0.49 3,304 NLD 0.20 0.64 -0.75 -1.47 5,127
(0.41) (0.33) (2.23) (0.87) (0.17) (0.17) (0.56) (0.36)
CHN 0.45 0.23 5,177 NZL 0.26 0.69 -0.85 0.33 3,876
(0.18) (0.18) (0.33) (0.30) (1.26) (0.83)
COL -0.06 0.96 -2.43 -1.30 3,308 PER -0.61 0.52 -0.88 -0.09 3,204
(0.44) (0.39) (1.82) (1.00) (0.41) (0.39) (2.04) (0.81)
CZE 0.50 -0.17 0.78 -0.55 4,859 PHL -0.61 0.57 -2.20 0.69 3,127
(0.21) (0.21) (0.51) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) (2.15) (0.85)
DEU 0.06 0.32 -0.13 -0.84 5,192 POL 0.29 0.17 -0.92 -1.10 4,903
(0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.51) (0.50)
DNK 0.27 0.19 1.48 -0.91 4,775 PRT 0.32 0.31 2.79 0.25 4,696
(0.23) (0.18) (0.76) (0.46) (0.26) (0.23) (0.81) (0.57)
ECU -0.10 -0.36 -3.47 2.05 1,876 ROU 0.46 0.60 1.74 0.66 4,381
(0.77) (0.56) (3.15) (1.16) (0.35) (0.30) (1.06) (0.70)
EGY 1.19 -0.18 4.11 -1.93 3,197 SGP 0.66 0.45 -0.77 -0.53 4,548
(0.51) (0.42) (1.54) (0.90) (0.32) (0.33) (1.15) (0.65)
ESP -0.29 0.52 -0.33 -1.08 5,099 SVK -0.58 0.45 0.75 -2.36 4,391
(0.18) (0.16) (0.53) (0.32) (0.32) (0.29) (0.87) (0.71)
FIN -0.36 0.41 0.21 -0.68 4,243 SVN -0.34 0.55 0.09 -0.12 4,321
(0.30) (0.31) (0.72) (0.76) (0.33) (0.27) (0.94) (0.69)
FRA 0.43 0.22 -0.56 -1.69 5,148 SWE -0.40 0.42 1.33 -0.38 4,766
(0.17) (0.16) (0.36) (0.34) (0.23) (0.24) (0.52) (0.46)
GBR 0.20 0.53 -0.09 -1.35 5,131 THA 0.10 0.70 1.32 1.21 4,575
(0.20) (0.17) (0.40) (0.32) (0.33) (0.27) (1.13) (0.57)
GRC 0.13 0.09 2.06 0.27 4,337 TUR 0.59 0.74 1.94 0.01 4,623
(0.29) (0.25) (1.11) (0.56) (0.28) (0.29) (0.64) (0.45)
HKG 0.29 -0.06 0.66 1.49 4,466 UKR 0.07 0.03 -0.90 -1.25 3,580
(0.38) (0.27) (1.35) (0.61) (0.35) (0.38) (1.23) (0.87)
HUN 0.24 0.47 -0.95 -0.15 4,549 USA 0.23 0.02 5,212
(0.30) (0.25) (0.94) (0.59) (0.17) (0.15)
IDN 0.02 -0.04 4.48 0.36 4,253 VNM 0.73 0.36 2.07 0.42 4,153
(0.38) (0.32) (1.61) (0.64) (0.35) (0.34) (0.97) (0.59)
IND 0.26 0.40 0.14 0.92 4,917 ZAF -0.20 1.03 -0.19 -2.87 4,915
(0.27) (0.21) (0.68) (0.58) (0.30) (0.26) (0.85) (0.58)
Notes: Table reports coefficients from running (12) on exports to the RW separately for each country. Each regression
includes pre-trend controls and sector fixed effects. 38
















ARG 0.61 -0.40 -2.95 -0.42 3,570 IRL -0.55 0.23 1.44 0.29 4,230
(0.34) (0.26) (1.42) (0.86) (0.29) (0.28) (1.21) (0.58)
AUS -0.25 -0.05 -1.12 1.04 4,607 ISR -0.35 -0.02 1.03 1.68 3,613
(0.27) (0.24) (1.27) (0.55) (0.44) (0.42) (2.67) (0.94)
AUT -0.24 -0.04 0.27 1.46 4,875 ITA -0.01 0.12 0.22 0.49 5,115
(0.22) (0.20) (0.45) (0.53) (0.18) (0.16) (0.25) (0.42)
BEL 0.51 -0.16 0.14 0.33 5,068 JPN 0.07 0.04 0.89 0.44 4,914
(0.20) (0.17) (0.35) (0.43) (0.22) (0.23) (0.27) (0.47)
BGR -0.25 -0.28 1.46 0.98 4,344 KOR 0.08 0.21 -0.38 0.93 4,710
(0.29) (0.26) (0.95) (0.57) (0.25) (0.24) (0.99) (0.61)
BRA -0.15 0.05 1.51 -0.32 4,420 MAR 0.73 0.24 0.90 -0.83 2,894
(0.27) (0.24) (1.11) (0.67) (0.39) (0.33) (1.81) (0.76)
CAN 0.36 -0.38 -0.07 0.49 4,755 MEX 0.42 -0.51 -0.81 1.03 4,440
(0.28) (0.24) (0.36) (0.75) (0.27) (0.27) (0.58) (0.73)
CHE 0.63 -0.10 -0.46 -1.17 4,660 MYS 0.26 -0.30 -0.34 -0.06 4,510
(0.34) (0.29) (0.85) (0.74) (0.32) (0.30) (0.87) (0.78)
CHL -0.52 -0.31 -0.85 0.24 3,313 NLD -0.01 -0.16 0.74 1.30 5,127
(0.35) (0.32) (1.75) (0.88) (0.20) (0.19) (0.53) (0.47)
CHN 0.35 0.01 5,171 NZL 0.22 -0.57 0.73 0.48 3,865
(0.19) (0.17) (0.40) (0.25) (1.10) (0.82)
COL -0.50 0.56 -2.11 1.41 3,254 PER 0.59 0.46 -2.80 0.79 3,188
(0.51) (0.43) (1.92) (1.08) (0.49) (0.42) (2.28) (0.88)
CZE 0.40 -0.37 0.19 0.26 4,852 PHL -0.59 0.34 -0.09 0.19 3,180
(0.21) (0.16) (0.45) (0.44) (0.43) (0.33) (2.21) (0.81)
DEU 0.23 0.11 0.36 0.02 5,188 POL -0.05 -0.10 0.98 0.58 4,897
(0.16) (0.13) (0.17) (0.27) (0.25) (0.19) (0.48) (0.45)
DNK 0.14 -0.03 1.12 1.00 4,772 PRT 0.30 0.10 -1.69 1.00 4,685
(0.22) (0.21) (0.73) (0.49) (0.28) (0.22) (0.85) (0.51)
ECU 0.30 -0.26 1.55 -0.04 1,948 ROU -0.39 -0.03 1.83 -0.63 4,378
(0.60) (0.45) (2.96) (1.16) (0.30) (0.23) (0.87) (0.54)
EGY 0.30 -0.13 0.96 1.03 3,148 SGP 0.04 -0.22 0.39 -2.08 4,554
(0.46) (0.32) (1.24) (0.72) (0.26) (0.25) (0.81) (0.72)
ESP 0.38 0.19 0.13 1.02 5,093 SVK -0.37 -0.10 1.62 0.51 4,374
(0.21) (0.17) (0.44) (0.34) (0.23) (0.22) (0.73) (0.64)
FIN 0.48 -0.10 0.01 0.27 4,248 SVN 0.06 0.05 0.63 1.04 4,315
(0.27) (0.23) (0.61) (0.60) (0.26) (0.22) (0.70) (0.69)
FRA 0.22 -0.10 0.40 1.03 5,144 SWE 0.22 -0.00 0.31 0.56 4,759
(0.21) (0.16) (0.37) (0.39) (0.26) (0.20) (0.36) (0.46)
GBR -0.28 -0.07 0.59 0.50 5,127 THA -0.08 -0.08 -0.28 0.17 4,597
(0.19) (0.19) (0.36) (0.50) (0.27) (0.25) (0.72) (0.59)
GRC -0.20 0.27 0.77 -0.80 4,327 TUR 0.71 -0.27 -0.66 0.49 4,606
(0.32) (0.22) (0.88) (0.64) (0.26) (0.22) (0.53) (0.54)
HKG -0.60 -0.09 -0.67 -1.00 4,480 UKR 0.84 -0.21 -0.19 -0.86 3,535
(0.37) (0.27) (1.46) (0.61) (0.31) (0.31) (0.95) (0.75)
HUN 0.13 -0.01 0.56 0.14 4,533 USA 0.43 -0.12 5,208
(0.26) (0.24) (0.95) (0.60) (0.20) (0.16)
IDN 0.44 0.01 -1.72 0.06 4,258 VNM -0.93 -0.05 0.12 0.97 4,195
(0.41) (0.30) (1.44) (0.71) (0.32) (0.29) (0.85) (0.68)
IND 0.34 0.07 0.82 0.93 4,911 ZAF 0.32 -0.04 0.78 -0.53 4,897
(0.25) (0.18) (0.43) (0.57) (0.26) (0.24) (0.67) (0.56)
Notes: Table reports coefficients from running (16) on export unit values to the WD separately for each country. Each
regression includes pre-trend controls and sector fixed effects.
TABLE A.6: ENTRY AND EXIT RESPONSES
Panel A: Exports from China and US
















∆TUSCH,ω (β1) 1.81 -0.03 -1.46 -0.03 1.87 -0.02 2.92 -0.05
(0.45) (0.05) (1.39) (0.02) (0.14) (0.07) (1.33) (0.02)
∆TCHUS,ω (β2) 0.52 -0.22 2.37 -0.09 -0.16 -0.65 0.56 -0.06
(0.16) (0.05) (0.58) (0.02) (0.11) (0.07) (0.92) (0.02)
Sector FE No No No No No No No No
R2 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.01
N 1,495 4,622 910 5,207 1,804 4,313 882 5,235
Exporters CHN CHN CHN CHN USA USA USA USA
Panel B: Exports from Rest of World












∆TUSCH,ω (β1) 0.47 0.06 0.34 -0.09 1.42 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.01)
∆TCHUS,ω (β2) 0.30 -0.24 0.39 -0.24 0.83 -0.16
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01)
∆TUSi,ω (β3) -1.12 -1.05 -0.09 0.40 -0.05 0.12
(0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.27) (0.03)
∆TCHi,ω (β4) -1.38 0.63 -1.00 0.06 -4.34 0.33
(0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.26) (0.03)
Country × Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.06
N 178,302 115,314 204,307 89,309 77,139 216,477
Exporters 48 48 48 48 48 48
Table shows entry and exit results. Panel A reports responses to each tariff for US and China. Panel B reports the
responses for RW to each market. Panel A regressions include sector fixed effects, and Panel B regressions include
country-sector fixed effects and cluster standard errors by product.
TABLE A.7: GLOBAL EXPORT RESPONSES INCLUSIVE OF EXTENSIVE MARGIN
from ↓/to→ US CH RW World
US 0.0% -26.0% 2.2% -0.9%
CH -8.5% 0.0% 5.5% 1.8%
RW 2.1% -3.6% 5.4% 3.9%
World -0.5% -6.3% 5.0% 3.1%
Table shows the breakdown of predicted aggregate export growth from US and China and bystander countries to
US,CH,RW and WD. The results are generated from the intensive margin responses in Table 3 and extensive margin
responses in Table A.6.
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B Model Appendix
B.1 Microfoundation of the Supply Side
We present a microfoundation for the supply curve in (6). We assume that, in country i and sector
j, a bundle of inputs and primary factors KT ij is used to produce tradeable goods. These inputs
could be determined endogenously through domestic or international mobility, but we do not need
to take a stand for our analysis. Each unit k of this input has productivity z0iωe
k
ω. The term z0iω is
common to all inputs allocated to ω. It depends on an exogenous component of productivity Ziω






where γi is a country specific scale elasticity. The parameter εi is country-specific and determines
factor mobility across products in response to changes in factor returns. In turn, the term ekω is










Each unit of factors k chooses a product ω in sector j and, conditional on the product, a bundle of
















j − cIijx, (B.20)
where piω is the price received by producers of ω in country i. The input bundle cIij combines the
different products ω with sector-specific weights. The unit cost of each product ω entering in cIij
corresponds to the price index of the translog aggregation implied by (1). Maximizing out x, the
problem is equivalent to each unit of inputs k being allocated where the value of its marginal






αIj−1 z0iω. Therefore, supply of inputs to
product ω in country i is






where rT ij are the factor returns in sector j of country i. The distributional assumption in (B.19)
implies that the total sales of product ω in sector j are Xiω = rT ijKiω. Using (B.18) and (B.21) we


















T ij , (B.23)




bi . The supply curve is
upward-sloping as long as scale economies are not too strong (γiεi < 1). The average returns to
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as an implicit function of
the prices and factor supply in sector j.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
As a preliminary step, we derive some equilibrium equations in changes. In what follows, let
X̂ ≡ ∆XX denote the infinitesimal change in the log of variable X , where ∆X = X
′ −X is the





, to a first order approximation, the equilibrium consists of changes in tradeable prices
{p̂iω} such that
i) from (6), price changes are given by
p̂iω = biX̂iω − biÂij ; (B.25)













is the share of sales to n in total sales of product ω from i, and where the changes











We now derive equations (9) and (11). Take exporter i 6= US,CH and suppose that the US and
China impose tariffs on each other and on other countries around an initial equilibrium. From the
market clearing condition (B.26) and the definition of expenditure shares (B.27), the total sales of ω









CH,ω + σiip̂iω ∑
n∈I
λ̃niω
+ T̂ otheriω +GE
0
iω (B.28)





where T̂ otheriω captures the direct impact on country i of US and China tariffs imposed on countries
other than each other,



















where we have imposed σRW = σi′i for i′, i 6= US,CH and i′ 6= i, and where GE0iω












Combining (B.28) with the inverse supply (B.25) we obtain the price change and total sales:
p̂iω =
bi















1− biσii ∑n λ̃niω
(B.32)




























































































ij , where j is
the sector to which ω belongs to, so that sales and expenditure shares vary by origin-destination



































































+ αnij + η
n
iω, (B.36)
where we have used that, decomposing demand Ênω into an importer-sector component Ênj and a
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1− biσii ∑n λ̃nij
+ ênω. (B.37)
Suppose further that we start around an equilibrium such that, within each sector, countries split




N ) and expenditure shares across






. Then, (B.36) adopts the functional forms in (9) and (11), with the coefficient βn1i given in









































































↔ biσiisi < 1 or
biσii
si
> NN−1 . If σCHi < 0, then
∂X̂niω
∂T̂US,CH,ω
< 0 given these




> 0 ↔ siσiibi > 1, implying that either: i)
1
bi
< σiisi < 0 with σii < 0, which further implies
si
σii
< bi < 0; or ii) 1bi >
σii
si
with σii > 0, implying
si
σii




< 0 ↔ siσiibi > 1, or again
1
bi
< σiisi < 0, implying bi < 0
with σii < 0.
C Additional Results
C.1 Instrumental Variables Approach
Here we present a complementary approach to studying how bystander countries’ exports
responses to the US-China tariffs. In our theoretical framework, downward-sloping supply curves
32If aggregate demand within sectors is Cobb-Douglas across products with same shares for consumers and
producers, then ênω = 0.
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imply that a change in exports to the rest of the world due to these tariffs must be mediated by a
change in exports to the US and/or China. This logic naturally suggests an instrumental variables
(IV) approach, where we regress countries’ product-level export growth to the rest of the world on
their product-level export growth to the US and China, instrumenting with the tariffs.
Before examining the results from this approach, we consider the four key assumptions that
must be satisfied to ensure unbiased IV estimation with heterogenous treatment effects (Imbens
and Angrist, 1994). First, we have argued earlier that the tariff changes are plausibly exogenous.
Second, the exclusion restriction requires that the tariffs must only affect countries’ export growth
to the rest of the world via changes in exports to the US and China. While this assumption strictly
holds in our theoretical framework, in reality it may be violated if, for example, expectations
change about the likelihood of additional tariffs, or tariffs broadly increase uncertainty about
the future path of government policies. In other words, it is possible that the tariffs directly
influence bystander countries’ exports to RW , rather than influence exports to RW through
changes in exports to US and/or CH . Third, there should be a strong first stage between the
tariffs and exports to the US and China, which we can assess empirically. Finally, the monotonicity
assumption requires that all countries respond to the tariffs in the same direction in the first stage.
This assumption is likely violated since, as we show in Figure 3, some countries’ exports are
complements with US and China, rather than substitutes. Notwithstanding these caveats, we view
the IV analysis as a useful and informative complement to the evidence we have provided in the
main text.
We turn now to the regressions, and trace the logic of our theoretical framework through the
results. First, column 1 of Table C.1 regresses Chinese export growth to the US on the US tariff
on China with industry fixed effects, and again confirms that the trade war caused a sharp and
statistically significant decline in US imports of Chinese products.33 Column 2 shows that the
US tariffs on China simultaneously caused third-party countries to increase their exports of those
targeted products to the US. Column 3 regresses bystanders’ export growth to the rest of the world
on their export growth to the US, instrumenting with the US tariff on China. The IV coefficient in
column 3 implies that, on average, a 1% increase in exports to the US due to the trade war tariffs
further induced a 0.70% increase in exports to the rest of the world.
Columns 4-6 show analogous regressions from the Chinese side. Column 4 demonstrates that
US exports of targeted products to China declined sharply. Column 5, which is the first stage of
column 6, shows that bystanders do not increase their exports of targeted products to the China,
consistent with the main results (the point estimate is negative and noisy). This first stage is weaker
than in column 3, perhaps reflecting modestly more prevalent violations of the monotonicity
assumption, which would be consistent with the results from Figure 3 showing that bystander
countries’ exports are more likely to be complements with China than with the US. Column 6
shows the IV specification, regressing bystanders’ export growth to RW on their export growth to
33Our analysis uses only one tariff (the US tariff for exports to US, or the China tariff for exports to CH) as the
instrument. We experimented with all four trade war tariffs but they do not yield sufficiently strong first-stages for the
second stage.
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China, instrumented with the China tariffs. The resulting IV coefficient is imprecisely estimated,
and difficult to interpret given the weak first stage.
In sum, the evidence from these IV specifications supports the main evidence that the trade
war tariffs increased the exports of bystander countries to the US and to the rest of the world and
decreased exports to China.
TABLE C.1: 2SLS SPECIFICATIONS




















Sector FE Yes No No Yes No No
Country-Sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
First-Stage F-Stat . 7.7 . 1.9
Observations 4,465 99,016 99,016 4,094 75,636 75,636
Exporters CHN 48 48 USA 48 48
Notes: Column 3 (6) examines rest of the world exports to rest of the world regressed on exports to the US (China)
which are instrumented with the US (China) tariffs on China (US). Standard errors clustered by product in columns 2-3
and 5-6.
C.2 Sector vs Country Heterogeneity
Our main empirical analysis in Section 4.3 allows for different countries’ exports to respond
heterogeneously to the trade war tariffs. Here, we further explore whether the data suggest
an important role for sector heterogeneity as well. Specifically, we estimate a slight variation
on equation (12), regressing the log change in exports each of each variety in sector j to each
destination n and including a country fixed effect:
∆ lnXniω = αni + βn1j∆ lnTUSCH,ω + βn2j∆ lnTCHUS,ω + βn3j∆ lnTUSi,ω + βn4j∆ lnTCHi,ω + πnj ∆ lnXniω,t−1 + εniω
(C.43)
Since we estimate (C.43) separately by sector and include country fixed effects, the
identification, as before, leverages variation across products within country-sectors. However,
here the tariff elasticities are permitted to vary by sector, rather than by country. We use the
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estimated coefficients to generate predicted values for each country exactly as in equation (13),
and aggregate to the country level exactly as in equation (14).
Figure C.1 plots the predicted values from the sector-heterogeneous regressions against the
predicted values from the country-heterogeneous regressions (taken from Figure 4). Recall that
the standard deviation in predicted responses from the country-heterogenous regressions is 4.4%,
while in contrast the standard deviation in predicted responses from the sector-heterogenous
regressions is 1.80%. We thus observe greater variance in predicted exports due to country
heterogeneity than due to sector heterogeneity. While it is possible that an analysis with greater
statistical power and/or a longer time horizon could identify a distinctive role for both country-
and sector-specific heterogeneity, the results support the decision to focus on country-specific
responses.
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Notes: Figure plots predicted country-level export growth from regression specifications that allow for country
heterogeneity (x-axis, taken from Figure 4) versus specifications that allow for sector heterogeneity (y-axis).
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